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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented by this appeal are: 
1. Have Dick Brady Systems, Inc. ("Systems") and 
Richard Brady ("Brady") Defendants and Appellants herein 
improperly augmented the record in this appeal by filing 
documents and affidavits not presented to the trial court? 
2. Are the orders appealled herein final orders 
under Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
and Rule 3(a) U.R.A.P. such as to confer jurisdiction 
on this Court to consider this appeal? 
3. If the orders appealled from herein are not final 
orders, does U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-19 (1) by statute confer 
jurisdiction on this Court to consider the orders appealled 
from herein? 
a. Does the Utah Arbitration Act U.C.A., 1953, 
§78-31-1 et. seq. ("Old UAA") apply to these proceedings 
rather than U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-l et. seq. ("New UAA")? 
i. Does the Old UAA provide for orders of the 
type appealled herein? 
ii. Does the Old UAA create an exception to 
the final judgment rule? 
b. Can the appeal herein be construed as an 
appeal under Rule 5 U.R.A.P.? 
c. Is the New UAA inapplicable in any event in 
these proceedings because it has been superseded under the 
-1-
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution by the 
Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §1 et. seq. ("FAA")? 
4. If the new UAA applies to these proceedings did Systems 
and Brady properly place the arbitration issue before the 
trial court under the statute thereby entitling them to 
the appeal rights provided by U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-19(1)? 
a. Did Systems and Brady request U^C.A., 1953, 
§78-31a-4 relief from the trial court? 
b. Did Systems and Brady comply with the jurisdic-
tional requirements of U.C.A. 1953, §78-31a-17(1) sufficient 
to place the arbitration issues under the New UAA before 
the trial court? 
5. In light of the findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and orders entered by the Honorable J. Thomas Greene, United 
States District Court Judge in Case No. C85-280G ("Federal 
Orders"), are there any orders which this Court can enter 
in this appellate procedure? 
6. Are credit collection claims existing under credit 
agreements between Docutel-Olivetti Corporation ("Docutel") 
and Systems excluded by the specific provision related there-
to in paragraph 10 from the general arbitration language of 
paragraph 12 of the Dealership Agreement between the parties? 
7. Is Brady entitled to arbitration under his Personal 
Guaranty in the absence of any agreement to arbitrate claims 
asserted against him under the Personal Guaranty? 
8. Miscellaneous issues raised by Systems and Brady 
which require a response are: 
-2-
a. In view of the fact Systems and Brady reserved 
all federal issues for the federal court was it error for 
the trial court not to apply provisions of the FAA to the 
proceedings below assuming the court did not in fact do so? 
b. Was it error for the trial court to fail to 
file findings of fact and conclusions of law where the 
motions filed below were noticed for hearing on the court's 
law and motion calendar; were apparently filed under Rule 12, 
U.R.C.P. and where Systems and Brady failed to file any pro-
posed findings of fact or conclusions of law or to formally 
move the court for any such findings of fact or conclusions of 
law? 
c. Was it error for the trial court to refuse to 
approve Systems and Brady's statement of proceedings under 
Rule 11(g) U.R.A.P. where no appeal had been filed, Appellants 
had failed to request a reporter at the hearing on their 
motions, and where Systems and Brady's statement of proceed-
ings did not contain statements of the proceedings and evi-
dence but rather entailed extensive post hac briefing and 
argument? 
i. Is the issue properly before this Court 
where the trial court did not enter an order on Systems and 
Brady's Motion to Approve Defendants' Statement of Proceed-
ings which was set for hearing by Systems and Brady on 
September 13, 1985 and where Systems and Brady failed to 
request mandamus from this Court under Rule 6 5B(3) U.R.C.P. 
and Rule 19 U.R.A.P. compelling the trial court to settle 
-3-
and approve a statement of proceedings? 
d. Was the trial court required to apply an 
11
 is sue-by-is sue" analysis of the alleged arbitration 
question under the New UAA where Systems and Brady failed 
to properly raise the New UAA in their motions and failed 
to request such relief in the original proceedings before 
the trial court? 
9. Under the attorney fee provision of paragraph 10 
of the Dealership Agreement between the parties and under 
Rule 33 U.R.A.P. is Docutel entitled to remand to the trial 
court to determine its attorney's fees on this appeal and 
related appeal Docket No. 20783 dismissed by this Court in 
favor of this appeal? 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This appeal is interlocutory and this Court lacks 
jurisdiction herein. The orders appealled herein are 
not final orders under Rule 3 U.R.A.P. and this Court 
has not granted nor has Appellant requested interlocutory 
appeal under Rule 5 U.R.A.P. 
U.C.A. 1953, §78-31a-19 does not confer jurisdiction 
for this appeal on this Court because Appellants never 
properly placed the New Utah Arbitration Act issues be-
fore the trial court. In any case, the orders appealled 
from herein are not one of the enumerated orders from which 
an appeal lies under §78-31a-19 nor did Appellants ask 
the trial court for any of the enumerated orders. Appellants 
chose to ask the federal district court for an order of 
arbitration rather than ask for such an order from the 
trial court below. Finally, the Utah Arbitration Act is in-
applicable in this interstate commerce case because it is 
superseded by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et. 
seq. 
There are no issues for this Court to decide because the 
federal district court has granted all Federal Arbitration 
Act relief to Appellants to which they are entitled. Under 
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution this 
Court cannot and should not enter an order which conflicts 
with the Federal Arbitration Act which has already been 
interpreted in the context of this dispute by a federal 
-5-
court at Appellants1 request. 
An arbitration agreement is like any other contract 
and general contract principals apply in its interpreta-
tion. Specific provisions of a contract prevail over 
general provisions and where an agreement is an integrated 
agreement the intent of the parties is to be determined 
from the four corners of the agreement. The Court cannot 
compel parties to arbitrate disputes which they did not 
agree in writing to arbitrate. 
Paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement is a specific 
provision which provides for litigation of credit claims 
and prevails over the general arbitration language of 
paragraph 12. 
Richard Brady is not entitled to arbitrate claims 
made against him under his Personal Guaranty, there being 
no written arbitration agreement between him and Docutel. 
Docutel is entitled to its attorney's fees herein under 
paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement and under Rule 33 
U.R.A.P. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order entered by the trial 
court below dated June 10, 198 5 denying Systems and Brady's 
motion to dismiss Docutel's complaint or to stay the pro-
ceedings pending arbitration which Systems and Brady 
sought under 9 U.S.C. §4 from the United States District 
Court for the Central District of Utah in Case No. C85-
0280G (R. 15, para. 7; R. 24, para. 1); and from an order 
entered July 19, 1985 by the trial court below denying 
Systems and Brady's objection to proposed order [the June 10, 
1985 order appealled herein] (R. 108-109); and motion to 
"clarify" decision [the June 10, 1985 order]. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On February 12, 1985 Brady and Systems filed a motion 
(R. 26-27) under Rule 12 U.R.C.P. (R. 22, para. 1, last 
sentence) to dismiss Docutel's complaint below or to stay 
the proceedings pending arbitration which Systems and 
Brady were seeking in related federal court proceedings 
under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 9 U.S.C. §4. 
Both parties filed memorandums with respect to the motion 
(R. 20-25; R. 30-60) and a hearing was noticed and held on 
the motion on May 24, 1985 (R. 28-29; R. 84) before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge. After oral 
arguments Judge Wilkinson announced his decision from the 
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bench and directed counsel to prepare an appropriate order. 
Counsel prepared a proposed order and sent a copy thereof 
to Systems and Brady's counsel. On May 31, 1985 Systems 
and Brady filed an objection to proposed order, motion to 
clarify decision (R. 102-104) and set the motion for hear-
ing on June 21, 1985 (R. 100-101). Both parties filed 
memorandums in connection with the May 31, 198 5 motions 
(R. 105-107; R. 114-117). Prior to the hearing on Systems 
and Brady's objection to proposed order, motion to clarify 
decision on June 21, 1985,Judge Wilkinson executed Docutel's 
proposed order on June 10, 1985 (R. 108-109). Systems and 
Brady also noticed for hearing on June 21, 1985 a motion 
to approve Defendants' Statement Of Proceedings under Rule 
11, U.R.A.P. (R. 110-111; R. 112-113). Docutel also filed 
and noticed for hearing on June 21, 1985 motions to enter 
default and strike Defendants' statement of proceedings from 
the record (R. 122-123; R. 133-134). The various motions 
were heard by Judge Wilkinson on June 21, 198 5, a ruling 
thereon made from the bench (R. 161) and counsel directed 
to prepare a proposed order. Counsel for both Systems and 
Brady and Docutel submitted proposed orders (R. 19 2-196; 
R. 197-198; R. 202-203) and each side by letter to Judge 
Wilkinson objected to the other's proposed order and sub-
mitted the matter for decision by the court. On July 19, 
1985 Judge Wilkinson signed and entered the order proposed 
by Docutel's counsel with certain deletions contained in 
-8-
paragraphs 4 and 6 thereof (R. 199-201). 
Prior to entry by the trial court of the July 19, 1985 
order, Systems and Brady filed a notice of appeal of the 
June 10, 1985 order below with this Court (R. 180-181) which 
was assigned Docket No. 20783. Docutel filed a motion to 
dismiss that appeal on July 10, 1985 and on August 6, 1985 
this Court dismissed Docket No. 20783. Systems and Brady 
filed a motion to vacate dismissal and reinstate appeal 
number 20783 which such motion was denied by this Court on 
September 3, 198 5. 
On August 8, 1985 (R. 208-209) Systems and Brady filed 
a new notice of appeal herein in which they appealled the 
June 10, 1985 order and paragraphs 3,4,5 and 6 of the July 
19, 1985 order, which has been assigned the within docket 
number and is now pending before this Court. 
Simultaneously with the proceedings below, Systems and 
Brady filed a petition with the United States District Court 
for the Central District of Utah under 9 U.S.C. §4 for an 
order compelling Docutel to submit all of its claims to 
arbitration including credit collection claims. The federal 
case is encaptioned: 
"In The Matter of the Arbitration Between 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC. a Utah Corporation, 
and RICHARD BRADY, Petitioners, vs. DOCUTEL-
OLIVETTI CORPORATION, Respondent, Civil No. 
C85-0280G." 
("Federal Action" hereafter). 
The Federal Action involves the Dealership Agreement at 
-9-
issue in these proceedings and the identical legal issue 
(i.e. are credit claims arbitrable under the Dealership 
Agreement). After extensive briefing and argument held on 
June 27, 1985 and September 6, 1985 respectively, the federal 
district court, the Honorable J. Thomas Greene presiding, 
entered two orders, one dated August 8, 1985 and the 
other dated September 19, 1985 ("Federal Orders") wherein 
the federal district court fully disposed of Brady and 
System's claim that credit claims are arbitrable. In 
support of those orders Judge Greene entered findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. Copies of the Federal Orders 
and findings are appended hereto as Appendix "A". This 
Court is asked to exercise its discretion and to take 
judicial notice of those orders and findings. 
The Federal Orders enjoined both Docutel and Systems and 
Brady from proceeding in this action on any issues other 
than claims based on separate credit agreements between 
the parties. Under the Federal Orders the only issues which 
remain alive below in these proceedings are credit collection 
claims. Although the Federal Orders did not attempt nor 
could they enjoin either this Court or the trial court from 
considering issues other than credit claims, as a practical 
matter that is all that remains of the proceedings below 
because under the Federal Orders none of the parties herein 
can litigate any other claims in these state court proceedings. 
Judge Greene found as a fact and concluded as a matter of 
-10-
law that the Dealership Agreement did not provide for 
arbitration of credit collection claims (A.7). 
C. Statement of Facts 
In their brief Appellants have listed 58 alleged 
facts, few of which are facts actually supported by 
competent evidence below or are relevant to the issues 
before this Court. In the first argument of this brief at 
pp. 13-17 infra, Docutel specifies the matters which were 
properly before the trial court and which properly make 
up the record on appeal herein. All other documents; 
transcripts and affidavits referred to by Systems and 
Brady in their statement of facts at pages 8 through 19 
of Brief of Defendants - Appellants ("Appellants Brief") 
and elsewhere referred to in Appellants1 Brief are ob-
jected to by Docutel as not properly part of the record 
in this appeal and cannot support the facts alleged. 
Part I of Docutel's argument infra specifies which alleged 
statement of facts set forth in Appellants' Brief are not 
supported by competent evidence and objects to them therein. 
One of the major problems with this matter is that 
because this Court has accepted this appeal prior to any 
discovery or evidentiary proceedings, there has been no 
development of facts because Systems and Brady have refused 
to submit to any discovery below and the trial court has 
been divested of jurisdiction by this appeal to order such 
discovery (R. 178-179; R. 220-227; R. 249-250; R. 251-259; 
R. 312). Those facts which are not argument and have been 
-11-
established by competent evidence presented to the trial 
court or admitted in the pleadings and are supported by 
the record are as follows: 
1. Olivetti Corporation (predecessor in interest to 
Docutel) and Systems entered into a certain Dealership 
Agreement dated February 17, 198 2 (R. 7-8) which speaks 
for itself as an integrated document with respect to 
the matters set forth therein. All disputes which exist 
between the parties are subsequent to the effective date 
of the Dealership Agreement (R. 63-64). 
2. Docutel is the successor and assignee of the 
position of Olivetti Corporation under the Dealership 
Agreement (R. 21). 
3. Brady executed a Personal Guaranty dated February 17, 
198 2 guaranteeing payment of all indebtedness owed Docutel 
as successor in interest to Olivetti Corporation by Systems 
(R. 9) . 
4. Docutel sold products to Systems evidenced by in-
voices sent to Systems (R. 71-73)• 
5. Systems received at least some of the products sold 
to it by Docutel (R. 124, para. 4). 
6. There are 33 outstanding invoices from Docutel to 
Systatis totaling some $49,147.70 dated from June 29, 1984 
to November 27, 1984 (R. 72, para. 6). 
In Argument No. I infra Docutel objects specifically 
to the statement of facts contained in Appellants1 Brief 
pages 8-19. 
-12-
ARGUMENT 
I. SYSTEMS AND BRADY HAVE IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTED TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD ON THIS APPEAL. 
A. The May 24, 198 5 Hearing 
The trial court was asked to rule on Systems and 
Brady's motion to dismiss complaint or stay proceedings 
pending arbitration based on the following documents filed 
and of record at the time of the May 24, 1985 hearing which 
resulted in the June 10, 1985 order appealled herein. 
1. Complaint, Civil No. 85-506, dated January 
24, 1985 (R. 2-9) together with a copy of the Dealership 
Agreement between the parties (Exhibit A, R. 7) and the 
Personal Guaranty (Exhibit B, R. 9) executed by Brady. 
2. Summons and Proof of Service thereon (R. 10-13). 
3. Motion for Dismissal or Stay of Proceedings 
Pending Arbitration Civil No. 85-506 dated February 12, 
1985 (R. 26-27). 
4. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Dismissal 
or Stay dated February 12, 1985 (R. 20-25). 
5. Affidavit of Richard Brady dated February 
12, 1985 (R. 14-19). 
6. Notice of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss or Stay 
Pending Arbitration dated May 8, 1985 (R. 28-29). 
7. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Dismissal or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration 
(R. 30-60). 
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In addition to the forgoing, Docutel filed an 
affidavit of Gilbert R. Peterson dated May 20, 198 5 with 
the trial court at the May 24, 1985 hearing (R. 71-73). 
Brady and Systems also filed an affidavit of Richard 
Brady dated April 23, 198 5 (but not filed with the trial 
court until May 23, 1985) (R. 61-70). Neither affidavit 
was timely filed under Rule 2(e) of the Rules of Practice 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, both parties 
objected to the others affidavit (R. 348, para. 2) and 
there is no indication in the record that the court con-
sidered either affidavit in arriving at its June 10, 1985 
order appealled herein. 
B. The June 21, 1985 Hearing 
The documents filed and of record at the time of 
the June 21, 1985 hearing which resulted in the July 19, 
1985 order appealled herein are: 
8. Objection to Proposed Order, Motion to Clarify 
Decision brought Under Rule 29 Rules of Practice District 
and Circuit Courts (inapplicable in the Third District -
see Rule 4 of the Third District Court Rules) dated May 31, 
1985 (R. 102-104). 
9. Notice of Hearing on Objection to the Proposed 
Order, Motion to Clarify Decision dated May 31, 1985 (R. 
100-101). 
10. Memorandum in Support of Objections to Proposed 
Order, Motion to Clarify Decision dated May 31, 1985 (R. 
105-107) . 
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11. Statement of Proceedings dated June 11, 
1985 (R. 142-160). 
12. Motion to Approve Defendants1 Statement of 
Proceedings dated July 11, 1985 (R. 110-111). 
13. Notice of Hearing dated June 11, 1985 (R. 
112-113). 
14. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Objection 
to Proposed Order, Motion to Clarify Decision dated 
June 14, 1985 (R. 114-117). 
15. Objection to Defendants' Statement of Pro-
ceedings and Motion to Strike Defendants' Statement of 
Proceedings from the Record dated June 14, 1985 (R, 118-
121) . 
16. Motion to Enter Default dated June 14, 198 5 
(R. 122-123). 
17. Notice of Hearing on Motion to Enter Default 
and Motions to Strike Defendants' Statement of Proceedings 
from the Record, dated June 14, 1985 (R. 133-134). 
18. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Enter 
Default dated June 19, 1985 (R. 137-141). 
19. Answer and Counterclaim (R. 124-132). 
In addition to the forgoing, Systems and Brady filed 
an affidavit of Richard Brady dated May 27, 1985 (R. 85-99) 
on May 31, 1985. However, that affidavit was not properly 
presented to the court in connection with the June 21, 
1985 hearing. Neither the objection to proposed order, 
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motion to clarify decision (R. 102-104) nor the memorandum 
in support of that motion (R. 105-107) referred to or re-
lied upon that affidavit nor was the court asked to con-
sider it, nor is there any indication in the record that 
the court in fact considered it. Additionally, the 
affidavit was in fact related to new issues not raised 
in the original motion and was not therefore properly 
before the court on a motion to clarify its ruling in 
connection with the original motion. The affidavit there-
fore was not properly before the trial court on June 21, 
19 8 5 and is not properly part of the record on this appeal. 
In addition to the forgoing, the following are relevant 
to the court order dated July 19, 1985 appealled in part 
herein: 
20. Order proposed by Brady and Systems (R. 19 2-
196) and accompanying letter. 
21. Order proposed by Docutel and accompanying 
letter (R. 199-202). 
22. Letter dated July 2, 1985 (R. 197-198). 
Brady and Systems failed to adequately develop the 
facts and issues before the trial court but have attempted 
to cure that failure by filing with this Court numerous 
documents, transcripts and affidavits not before the trial 
court when it considered and entered the orders appealled 
from herein. By this procedure, Brady and Systems attempt 
to have this Court engage in what is properly a trial court 
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function. Issues not presented to the trial court cannot 
be presented for the first time on appeal. Tranyer v Gushing, 
Utah 688 P.2d 856 (1984) Rosenlof v Sullivan, Utah 676 P.2d 372 
(1983); Nelson v Newman, Utah 583 P.2d 601 (1978) 
Systems and Brady in their brief (pp. 8-19) list 58 
alleged facts, many of which rely on documents and trans-
cript of proceedings not before the trial court and not 
properly before this Court on appeal. A party may not 
supplement the record on appeal without permission of this 
Court. Kennedy v New Era Industries, Utah 600 P.2d 534, 
536 fn 3 (1979). 
Rule 11(a) U.R.A.P. specifies what constitutes the 
record on appeal. That record consists only of papers "filed 
in the district court" and the "transcript of proceedings", if 
any, before the trial court. Many of the documents relied upon 
by Brady and Systems in support of their statement of facts 
are not allowed in the record under Rule 11(a) and Docutel 
objects thereto. Specifically, Docutel objects to those doc-
uments listed in the Appendix to Appellants1 Brief (A1-A50 
and A54-A71) to the extent they are relied upon as establish-
ing facts. In addition, other than the documents listed in 
this section, no other documents were before the trial court 
below and cannot be reviewed on this appeal as part of the 
record. Docutel objects to each of Appellants 58 statements 
of facts to the extent that they conflict with Docutel's 
statement of facts in this brief and specifically objects to 
the reference to the record to Appellants' Appendix or to 
documents not before the trial court. 
II. THE JUNE 10, 1985 AND JULY 19, 1985 ORDERS ENTERED 
BELOW ARE NOT "FINAL" ORDERS UNDER ARTICLE VIII OF 
THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND RULE 3(a) U.R.A.P. 
AND ABSENT SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORITY THIS COURT 
LACKS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE APPEAL OF THOSE 
ORDERS. 
On July 1, 1985 the repeal and reenactment of Article 
VIII of the Utah Constitution became effective. Section 
5 grants to the district courts board original jurisdic-
tion while §3 grants to the Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction. Section 5 grants an appeal as a matter of 
right from courts of original jurisdiction to courts of 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Section 4 grants to the Supreme Court the power to 
adopt rules of procedure to manage the appellate process. 
This court has adopted Rule 3(a) U.R.A.P. to cover appeals 
as a matter of right. Under Sections 4 and 5 of the Utah 
Constitution, Rule 3(a) governs when a party may take an 
appeal as a matter of right from the district court to the 
Supreme Court. 
Rule 3 U.R.A.P. provides in relevant part: 
"An appeal may be taken from a district 
court to the Supreme Court from all final 
orders and judgments..." 
This Court has defined a final order as follows: 
"[a] Judgment, to be final, must dispose 
of the case as to all the parties, and 
finally dispose of the subject-matter of the 
litigation on the merits of the case." 
Kennedy v New Era Industries, Inc., Utah 
600 P.2d 534, 536 (1979)(emphasis in 
original) 
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In the recent case of Pate v Marathon Steel Company, 
Utah,692 P.2d 765 (1984) this Court said at 693: 
"Under traditional principles, which are 
reflected in Utah's Rule 72(a), parties 
to a suit generally are entitled to only 
one appeal as a matter of right, regard-
less of the number of parties or issues 
presented for disposition, and an appeal 
can be taken only from the entry of a final 
judgment that concludes the action." 
Docutel's complaint filed below is for money damages 
for goods sold and delivered under credit agreements be-
tween the parties. That claim remains pending and has 
not been finally disposed of. Under Utah precedent, the 
orders appealled herein are not final under Rule 3(a) U.R 
and absent some other statutory authority, this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the trial 
court's order denying Systems and Brady's motion to dis-
miss Docutel's complaint. 
"An order denying a motion to dismiss 
leaves the parties in court and does not 
constitute a fina] judgment...[Citations] 
—•-This court does not have jurisdiction 
to reach the merits." 
Richards v Leavitt, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 
P.2d (Utah 1985)(emphasis added) 
III. U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-19(l) DOES NOT CONFER JURIS-
DICTION ON THIS COURT TO CONSIDER THE JUNE 10, 198 5 
AND JULY 19, 1985 ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT ENTER-
ED BELOW. 
A. U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-19(l) Became Effective 
After The Complaint Herein Was Filed And Is 
Inapplicable To These Proceedings. 
Docutel's complaint herein was filed on January 24, 
1985. The New UAA became effective on April 29, 1985. 
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Brady and Systems argue that the New UAA is a "procedural" 
statute and therefore entitled to retroactive application 
(Appellants1 Brief p. 36). A comparison of the New UAA 
with the Old UAA however clearly demonstrates that the 
New UAA changes substantive rights and regardless of the 
language of the "enrolled copy" of the bill which is not 
part of the statute, the New UAA is substantive and not 
procedural. 
For example, under the New UAA an allegation of fraud 
specifically removes the dispute from arbitration. U.C.A. 
1953, §78-31a-3. This provision is not contained in the 
Old UAA. U.C.A. 1953, §78-31-1. Another example of how 
the New UAA has changed substantive rights of the parties 
is contained in Old UAA, §78-31-2. In that provision, an 
agreement to arbitrate required the agreement to state the 
question in controversy with definiteness, a provision not 
contained in the New UAA. Under §78-31-2 of the Old UAA it 
is doubtful that the general arbitration language of para-
graph 12 of the Dealership Agreement (R. 8) is sufficiently 
specific to be enforceable under the Old UAA. 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution gives a party a 
right to appeal from courts of original jurisdiction. That 
is a substantive right. Under established Utah precedent 
and rules authorized by statute, the right to appeal is 
from a "final" order of the court of original jurisdiction. 
The Old UAA did not provide for an appeal as a right from 
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orders denying a motion to compel arbitration. The New 
UAA does provide for such an order. U.C.A., 1953, §78-
31a-19(1). Assuming arguendo that the orders appealled 
herein are covered by §78-31a-19, that statute effects 
the substantive right to appeal and is not procedural. 
Other substantive provisions of the New UAA include the 
stay provision of §78-31a-4 depriving parties of their day 
in court. 
Another provision in the Old UAA not contained in 
the New UAA is §78-31-13 mandating that questions of law 
be submitted to a court by the arbitrators if requested 
by one of the parties. The New UAA does away with this 
substantive right. 
The Court is also referred to Southland Corporation 
v Keating, U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1985) 
and particularly the dissent of Justice O'Connor therein. 
The main issue in Southland was whether the FAA was 
"substantive" and therefore applicable to the states or 
"procedural". The majority concluded that the FAA is 
substantive law binding on the states. As Brady and Systems 
have argued, the UAA is almost (but not quite) identical to 
the FAA (R. 22, para. 2, last sentence). The discussion of 
substance in Southland Corp. is equally applicable here. 
The New UAA like the FAA is substantive and is therefore 
inapplicable to these proceedings. 
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B. The Old UAA Applicable In These Proceedings 
Does Not Provide For Interlocutory Appeals 
Or For Orders Compelling Arbitration, 
U.C.A., 1953, §78-31-22 (There may be a question as 
to whether U.C.A. §78-31-1 et. seq. has in fact been 
repealed or superseded by the New UAA. Nothing in the 
New UAA appears to repeal the Old UAA.) provides for 
appeals only from a "final judgment" on an arbitration 
award specified in §78-31-21. 
Nothing in the Old UAA either provides for a motion to 
compel arbitration or for an appeal from an order denying 
a motion to dismiss a complaint or stay proceedings pending 
arbitration. 
C. The New UAA Does Not Confer Jurisdiction On 
This Court To Hear This Interlocutory Appeal. 
Appellants assert that this Court has jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal under U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-19. Appellants 
attempt to characterize the order as an "Anti-Arbitration 
Order", thereby bringing it under §78-31a-19. 
Section 78-31a-19 provides for appeals from only the 
following court orders: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(2) granting a motion to compel arbitration; 
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an 
arbitration award; 
(4) modifying or correcting an award; or 
(5) vacating an award without directing arbitration. 
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The order appealled herein is not one of the five orders 
from which an appeal is authorized under §78-31a-19. More-
over , Appellants never requested any of the orders innumer-
ated in §78-31a-19 from the trial court. Appellants 
merely requested that the trial court dismiss the complaint 
or stay the proceedings pending arbitration (R. 26-27), an 
arbitration order which they believed they would obtain 
from the federal court (R. 15; R. 24). Moreover the motion 
was made under the Old UAA not the New UAA (R. 27). 
The New UAA to be invoked under the circumstances of 
this case, required that a motion be made to the trial court 
for an order compelling arbitration. U.C.A.# 1953, §78-31a-4* 
Except for §78-31a-4(3) which provides that if an order of 
arbitration is made upon motion of a party that order 
acts as a stay of issues subject to arbitration, although 
other issues severable from arbitration may go forward, no 
other provision of the New UAA contemplates an order for a 
stay of proceedings, nor does §78-31a-19 provide for an 
immediate appeal of the denial of such a motion. 
This Court cannot create a right to an immediate 
appeal where none exists. An appeal may be had only from 
final judgments unless otherwise provided by statute, or 
upon grant of a petition by this Court for an interlocutory 
appeal under Rule 5 U.R.A.P. For reasons set forth below, 
this Court has not granted a Rule 5 petition for an inter-
locutory appeal in this matter nor can this appeal be con-
strued as such a petition. 
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U.C.A. 1953, §78-31a-19 appears by statute to create 
an exception to the final judgment rule in arbitration 
cases. However, that statute enumerates the orders from 
which an immediate appeal may be taken. Neither the 
June 10, 198 5 order nor the July 19, 198 5 order appealled 
herein are one of the five enumerated orders in §78-31a-19, 
nor were any such orders requested from the trial court by 
Systems and Brady. 
Systems and Brady specifically elected to litigate 
their motion to compel arbitration before the federal district 
court. The fact that the federal district court did not 
grant them all the relief they requested does not permit 
Systems and Brady to ask this Court for the first time on 
appeal for an order compelling arbitration. As pointed out 
above, the New UAA does not provide for an order staying 
proceedings pending arbitration nor does §78-31a-19 provide 
for an immediate appeal of the denial of a motion for such 
an order. 
D. This Appeal Is Not Here Under Rule 5 U.R.A.P. 
Nor Can The Appeal Be So Construed As Being A 
Petition For An Interlocutory Appeal Under Rule 
5 U.R.A.P. 
As set forth in the brief, the orders appealled herein 
are neither final nor is there any statutory right to an 
immediate appeal thereof. 
Under appropriate circumstances, an interlocutory 
order may be appealled to this Court. Rule 5 U.R.A.P., 
Kennedy v New Era Industries, Utah, 600 P.2d 534 (1979). 
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However, for this Court to grant an interlocutory appeal, 
Appellants must file a petition for such an order within 
20 days after entry of the order. Rule 5(a) U.R.A.P. 
Appellants not only failed to file such a petition 
they have consistently maintained that this appeal is 
properly before this Court under Rule 3, U.R.A.P. and not 
Rule 5 (See generally R. 251-259; R. 318-331). 
The Utah Constitution, Article VIII, §5 grants 
original jurisdiction to the district courts. The district 
courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction except through 
duly adopted rules and laws on appeal. Appellate juris-
diction of this Court lies only under Rules 3 or 5 U.R.A.P. 
Rule 3 U.R.A.P. provides for appeals only from final 
judgments disposing of all issues below unless a statute 
provides otherwise. Section 78-31a-19 relied on by Systems 
and Brady does not confer jurisdiction on this Court. 
Section 78-31a-19provides in pertinent part for appeals 
only from motions to compel arbitration. Systems and 
Brady did not request such a motion from the trial court 
below. 
In the initial stages of this appeal, this Court may 
have considered the appeal as a petition under Rule 5 
U.R.A.P. and proceeded accordingly. However, due to Systems 
and Brady's insistence that the appeal was filed as a matter 
of right under Rule 3, U.R.A.P., and because this Court 
systematically and summarily refused all relief requested 
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by Docutel under Rule 5 U.R.A.P. [This Court even assessed 
attorneyfs fees against Docutel for filing such motions.] 
this Court has conclusively established that this appeal is 
before this Court under Rule 3 and not Rule 5 U.R.A.P. 
E. Neither The Old UAA Nor The New UAA Confers 
Jurisdiction On This Court To Consider The 
Orders Appealled Herein Because The Federal 
Arbitration Act Supersedes Both Utah Arbitra-
tion Acts In These Proceedings. 
The contract between the parties herein involves inter-
state commerce. All parties concede that the contract is 
subject to the FAA. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled in Southland 
Corporation v Keating, U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed. 
2d 1, (L984) that the FAA is a substantive rule applicable 
in state as well as federal courts and that the FAA supersedes 
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
any and all conflicting state laws. The court in Southland 
quoting from Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury 
Construction Corp., 460, U.S.I, 103 S.Ct., 927, 74 L.Ed. 2d 765 
(1983). 
"In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v 
Mercury Construction Corp, U.S., at 
, n. 32, 103 S.Ct. 
at 942 n. 32, we reaffirmed our view that 
the Arbitration Act f creates a body of 
federal substantive law1 and expressly 
stated what was implicit in Prima Paint, 
i.e., the substantive law the Act created 
was applicable in state and federal court... 
We thus read the underlying issue of 
arbitrability to be a question of sub-
stantive federal law: 'Federal law in 
the terms of the Arbitration Act governs 
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that issue in either state or federal 
court.1 Id. at , 103 S.Ct., at 
941." 
Southland Corporation v Keating, Id. 
at 104 S.Ct. 859. 
Under Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Southland 
the question is whether credit collection claims (being 
the only issues alive below) are arbitrable. That issue has 
already been decided by the Federal Orders (A.1-18). 
Systems and Brady imply in their brief that the UAA can 
grant greater relief than is available under the FAA and 
therefore this Court can rule that credit claims are 
arbitrable under the UAA even though a competent federal 
court has ruled that they are not arbitrable under FAAe 
Systems and Brady assume erroneously that a state is not 
foreclosed from legislating (or judicially interpreting) 
the same matters legislated by Congress as long as the 
legislation (or judical ruling) gives greater relief than 
Congress saw fit to grant. That, however, is not the law. 
In the leading case of Carleston & Car R.R. v 
Vamville Co. 237 U.S. 597 (1914) the United States Supreme 
Court struck down a state regulation imposing a $50 fine on 
a common carrier for failing to timely pay claims on the 
grounds that the $50 was a sufficient burden on inter-
state commerce and that the state regulation even though 
it granted greater relief than afforded under regulations 
authorized by Congress, was superseded by the federal laws 
(i.e. the federal rules "occupied the field"). 
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"When Congress has taken the particular 
subject matter in hand coincidence is as 
ineffective as opposition, and a state 
law is not to be declared a help because it 
attempts to go farther than Congress has 
seen fit to go." 
Charleston & Car R.R. v Varnville Co. 
237 U.S. 597 at 604. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not 
ruled in every case since Varnville that the "coincidence" 
(i.e. the same subject matter of federal legislation) 
automatically precludes state action, it is a very persua-
sive test as to whether the state law must give way. What 
the court says unmistakenly however is that where the state 
and federal laws conflict, the state law must give way. 
"Even if Congress has not completely fore-
closed state legislation in a particular 
area, a state statute is void to the ex-
tent that it actually conflicts with a 
valid federal statute. A conflict will be 
found where compliance with both federal 
and state regulations is a physical im-
possibility. . ." 
Ray v Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 
151,158, 98 S.Ct.988, 50 L.Ed 2d 179(1978) 
The inescapable conclusion from reading both the 
majority and dissents in Southland is that in the context 
of the interstate contract between Docutel and Systems, the 
FAA supersedes the UAA and leaves no room for application 
thereof. Even if it could be argued that the State of Utah 
could further regulate arbitration agreements covered by 
the PAA, the UAA would still fall because it conflicts with 
the FAA on its face and as interpreted by Judge Greene. 
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i. 
The UAA On Its Face Conflicts 
With the FAA 
The comparable provisions of the FAA and the New UAA 
at issue are as follows: 
The FAA provides: 
"A written provision in any maritime trans-
action or a contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such contract or transaction, or 
the refusal to perform the whole or any 
part thereof, or an agreement in writing 
to submit to arbitration an existing contro-
versy arising out of such a contract, trans-
action, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract." 
9 U.S.C. §2 (1976) 
The New UAA which Systems and Brady insist applies in 
these proceedings provides: 
"Arbitration agreement. A written agree-
ment to submit any existing or future con-
troversy to arbitration is valid, enforce-
able, and irrevocable, except upon grounds 
existing at law or equity to set aside 
the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as 
provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. " 
78-31a-3 U.C.A. (emphasis added) 
The New UAA unlike the FAA provides that where "fraud 
is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" 
a controversy is not subject to arbitration. The fraud 
issue was specifically before the United States Supreme 
Court in Prima Paint Corp. v Flood & Conklin Manufacturing 
Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed. 2d. 1270 (1967) 
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In Prima Paint one of the parties attempted to have a fraud 
claim litigated in federal court rather than having the 
claim submitted to arbitration under the FAA. Southland 
Corp. explained the holding in Prima Paint as follows: 
"The Court held that, notwithstanding a 
contrary state rule, consideration of a 
claim of fraud in the inducement of a 
contract 'is for the arbitrators and not 
the courts1 jLd. at 400, 87 S.Ct. at 1804." 
Southland Corp. v Keating, supra at 104 S.Ct. 
858-859. 
U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-3 relied on by Systems and Brady 
in these proceedings on its face conflicts with the FAA as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and must give 
way to the FAA. 
ii. 
The New UAA Conflicts With The FAA In This 
Case As Interpreted By The Federal Courts 
If This Court Rules That Credit Collection 
Claims Are Arbitrable Under The New UAA 
Judge Greene has interpreted the exact language and 
agreement before this Court under the FAA and has concluded 
that credit collection claims are not arbitrable thereunder 
(A.7,111-3). Since credit collection claims are the only 
claims the parties can litigate under the Federal Orders in 
these state court proceedings, and because the FAA applies, 
the only order that this Court could enter herein different 
from the FAA is that the UAA requires arbitration of credit 
collection claims. An order in direct conflict with the FAA 
as interpreted by Judge Greene. 
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Were this Court to order that under the UAA credit 
claims are arbitrable, the parties would be confronted 
with conflicting rules on the same claims. Under the 
FAA credit claims are not arbitrable. Under the UAA they 
are. It would be impossible for the parties to comply 
with both orders. Under these circumstances, the state 
rule (i.e. that credit claims are arbitrable) must give way 
to the federal rule that they are not. 
"A holding of federal exclusion of state 
law is inescapable and requires no inquiry 
into congressional design where compliance 
with both federal and state regulations 
is a physical impossibility for one engaged 
in interstate commerce." 
Florida Avacado Growers, Inc. v Paul 
373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct.121, 10 L.Ed. 
2d 248(1963) 
This Court is faced with a unique situation in this 
matter in considering a claim of supremacy of federal 
versus state law. This Court has before it not only a 
determination by the United States Supreme Court that the 
FAA is the supreme law of the land in interstate commerce 
cases, it also has before it an interpretation of that law 
as it applies to the very facts and agreements before this 
Court. If the Court interprets the UAA to include in arbi-
tration credit collection claims it must by necessity enter 
an order in conflict with the FAA which has been competently 
interpreted under the identical fact situation by a federal 
court. But the law as interpreted would be void under the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Thus 
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this Court cannot enter any order different from that 
which already exists under the federal order. Accordingly 
there is nothing for this Court to decide in this appeal. 
IV. SYSTEMS AND BRADY FAILED TO TAKE THE APPROPRIATE 
PROCEDURAL STEPS ENTITLING THEM TO APPEAL HEREIN 
UNDER THE NEW UAA 
Assuming arguendo that the New UAA applies in these 
proceedings, Brady and Systems are not entitled to appeal 
the June 10, 1985 and July 19, 1985 orders herein under 
D.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-19 because they did not comply with 
the procedures specified in the New UAA to properly bring 
the arbitration matter before the trial court. 
Section 78-31a-19 provides for appeals only from an 
order either denying a motion to compel arbitration or grant-
ing a motion to stay arbitration. Section 78-31a-4 provides 
that the court shall "upon motion of any party" order the 
parties to arbitration if it determines that the issue is 
covered by a written arbitration agreement. Section 78-31a-17 
(1) provides: 
"(1) Notice of an initial motion for an order 
of arbitration shall be served as provided 
by law for the service of summons..." 
Nothing in the New UAA authorizes or provides for a 
motion to dismiss a suit previously filed or to stay that suit 
pending arbitration. Section 78-31a-4(3) does provide for 
an automatic stay of proceedings involving an issue subject 
to arbitration but that stay is in conjunction with an order 
to submit an agreement to arbitration. 
Systems and Brady's motion for dismissal (R. 26-27) 
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which resulted in the June 10, 1985 order appealled herein, 
did not request an order compelling arbitration. In fact 
Brady and Systems specifically reserved that issue for the 
federal courts (R. 15, para. 7; R. 24, parae 1). Further, 
Brady and Systems did not request an order to compel 
arbitration in their May 31, 1985 motion (R. 102-104) which 
resulted in the July 19, 1985 order. 
Brady and Systems never requested that Judge Wilkinson 
enter an order compelling arbitration below. Moreover Brady 
and Systems never properly brought the New UAA issues before 
the trial court. 
U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-17(l) requires that a motion be 
"served as provided by law for the service of summons". 
Brady and Systems cannot show that such service was 
effected. Even if their February 12, 1985 and May 31, 
198 5 motions could be construed as "an initial motion for 
an order of arbitration" that motion was jurisdictionally 
defective because they were not "served as provided by law 
for the service of summons." 
V. THERE ARE NO ISSUES UPON WHICH THIS COURT CAN ENTER 
A RULING 
The factual issue before this Court is whether credit 
claims are arbitrable under the general arbitration 
provision of the Dealership Agreement. The interpreta-
tion of the arbitration language in the agreement is governed 
by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et. seq. The 
Federal Orders (Appendix A) obtained by Systems and Brady 
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cover the precise issue. 
In granting the relief under the August 8, 198 5 Federal 
Order (A1-A3) the federal court interpreted the very language 
of the agreement at issue before this Court. 
Under the August 8, 198 5 Federal Order the only issues 
remaining below which the parties may litigate here are those 
issues which are governed by separate credit agreements be-
tween the parties. The August 8, 1985 order contemplated 
proceedings before Judge Wilkinson to determine what if any 
such issues exist. The filing by Appellants and acceptance 
by this Court of this appeal has prevented such a determin-
ation at this time. The parties have been ordered to arbi-
trate all other issues not covered by separate credit agree-
ments. 
In light of the August 8, 198 5 Federal Order there is 
nothing for this Court to decide. As a practical matter there-
fore, the only ruling that this Court could make that has not 
already been made is to rule that credit claims are also 
arbitrable under the FAA, essentially overruling Judge Greene 
on a federal question, a ruling, if such is to be made, 
appropriately left to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals where 
that issue is now pending. 
VI. CREDIT CLAIMS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL ARBI-
TRATION PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT 
The United States Supreme Court stated that Con-
gressonal intent in adopting the FAA was to place: 
"
f[a]n arbitration agreement...upon the same 
footing as other contracts, where it belongs1 
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H.R. Rep. No. 96, supraf." 
Southland Corp. v Keating, supra 104 
S.Ct. at 861. 
Arbitration agreements are not sacred documents, the 
invocation of which without more, as Appellants would have 
it, requires this Court to close its mind to any conclusion 
other than that a particular matter must be arbitrated. 
Arbitration, by its nature, deprives the parties of their 
constitutional right to have their claims determined in 
court either before a judge or jury. Arbitration is 
sanctioned only because the parties agreed in writing to 
waive those rights. Arbitration is a creature of contract 
and before a court blindly deprives parties of their court 
remedy because "arbitration" is invoked it must clearly see 
that the parties have in fact agreed to arbitrate the dis-
pute. There is and can be no policy in the law forcing 
arbitration where none has been agreed to. The purpose of 
the various arbitration acts, both federal and state, is 
not to prefer or mandate arbitration over litigation but 
rather to validate arbitration agreements which had been 
held contrary to English common law as adopted by American 
courts. 
Like the FAA the UAA is designed to validate arbitra-
tion agreements. However, neither the UAA nor the policy 
of Utah is or can go beyond merely enforcing arbitration 
agreements between the parties. If there is no agreement 
to arbitrate, the courts will not and cannot compel such 
arbitration. Appellants overstate their case (Appellants' 
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Brief p. 22) in asserting that the policy of both the United 
States and Utah is to "promote arbitration of disputes". 
No such policy can be implemented. All that the policies 
promote is the placing of arbitration agreements "upon 
the same footing as other contracts". This court has said: 
"Arbitration is a contractual remedy for 
the settlement of disputes by extrajudicial 
means. It is a remedy freely bargained 
for...but it should not be invoked to re-
solve disputes that the parties have not 
agreed to arbitrate. 
Lindon City v Engineers Const. Co./ Utah/ 636 
P.2d 1070/ 1073 (1981)(emphasis added) 
A policy in favor of validating arbitration agreements 
between the parties is not the same as a policy biased 
towards arbitration of disputes. One validates agree-
ments freely entered into, the other may result in de-
priving parties of their constitutional right to have their 
day in court. 
Although policy may favor liberal interpretation of 
arbitration agreements, it does not mandate that every 
dispute is arbitrable. To determine whether a particular 
dispute is arbitrable an examination of the alleged arbitra-
tion agreement using general principles of contract inter-
pretation must be made. 
Paragraph 14 (R.8) of the Dealership Agreement is an 
integration provision. As such, the subjective intent of 
the agreement is to be determined by examination of its 
four corners with reference to parol evidence only to re-
solve ambiguities in the agreement. 
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In examining an agreement to determine the subjective 
intent of the parties thereto, a court will give effect to 
each provision thereof and will not interpret an agreement 
so as to nullify a provision or to bring it into conflict 
with other provisions• The principal has been stated by 
the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals as follows: 
"Normally a court will give effect to all 
provisions of a contract and will harmonize 
the various provisions unless they are 
'necessarily repugnant1". 
Western Oil Fields, Inc. v Pennzoil United, 
Inc. 421 F.2d 387,389(5th Cir. 1970) 
Another important principal of contract interpretation 
is expressed by the Restatement (2nd) Contracts §203(c) as 
follows: 
11
 (c) specific terms and exact terms are 
given greater weight than general language." 
The rule has been explained by the Arizona Court of 
Appeals as follows: 
"If the apparent inconsistency is between a 
clause that is general and broadly inclusive 
in character and one that is more limited 
and specific in its coverage, the latter 
should generally be held to operate as a 
modification and pro tanto nullification 
of the former." United California Bank v 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America 681 P.2d 
390,425 (Ariz. 1984). 
Other courts have also expressed the principal: 
"It is well settled that a special or more 
particular clause [paragraph 12] must prevail 
over a general clause [Article III]." 
Western Oil Fields, Inc. v Pennzoil, supra, 
at 389 
"Paragraph 17 is a general paragraph governing 
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the rights of the parties after attachment 
of their rights. Paragraph 19 is a special 
paragraph governing the rights of the parties 
prior to transfer of possession. A special 
clause, fitting special circumstances, must 
prevail over a general clause, applicable 
generally to other situations." 
Fox Realty Co. v Mongomery Ward & Co. 124 
Fd. 2d. 710, 714 (7th Cir. 1941) (emphasis added) 
With the forgoing principals in mind, the issue before 
this Court is whether the Dealership Agreement provides for 
litigation rather than arbitration of credit claims. 
Turning to the Agreement, the arbitration language is 
contained in paragraph 12 and provides, inter alia; 
"All disputes arising under this Agreement 
or pertaining in any manner to the dealer-
ship created by this Agreement shall be 
resolved by arbitration by an Appeal Board 
in accordance with the then current Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association ("A.A.A.")." 
Paragraph 12 is clearly a general provision. Without 
more, it would appear to require that credit claims of the 
type asserted below must be submitted to arbitration. How-
ever, paragraph 10 of the Agreement specifically covers credit 
claims and provides inter alia; 
"If an event of default by Dealer occurs 
under any credit agreement with Olivetti, 
Olivetti may, among other remedies, avail 
itself of any remedy in effect now or at 
the time of default under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code or any similar statute. In the 
event Olivetti successfully brings legal 
action against Dealer for the collection of 
an unpaid account, Dealer agrees to pay all 
reasonable collection costs and legal ex-
penses including reasonable attorney's fees, 
(emphasis added) 
The reference to the UCC in paragraph 10 incorporates 
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therein the entire body of law of remedies under the UCC. 
The remedies available under the Utah version of the UCC, 
are found in U.C.A., 1953, §§ 70A-2-701 et seq. and §§70A-
9-501 et seq. 
Sections 70A-2-701 through 70A-2-725 U.C.A. contain 
the remedies available in general under contracts of sale 
either secured or unsecured. Section 70A-2-703(e) provides 
that upon default a seller may: 
11
 (E) recover damages for nonacceptance 
(Section 70A-2-708) or on a proper case 
the price (Section 70A-2-709)" (emphasis 
added) 
Section 70A-2-708(l) refers to §70A-2-723 with respect 
to proof of market price. Section 70A-2-723(l) provides in 
part: 
"(1) If an action based on anticipatory 
repudiation comes to trial before the time 
for performance..." 
Section 70A-2-723(3) provides: 
"Evidence of a relevant price prevailing 
at a time or place other than the one des-
cribed in this chapter by one party is not 
admissible unless and until he has given the 
other party such notice as the court finds 
sufficient to prevent unfair surprise." 
Section 70A-2-723 clearly contemplates litigation rather 
than arbitration. Subsection (1) refers to a "trial" rather 
than an arbitration "hearing" (§78-31a-7 U.C.A.) and Sub-
section (3) refers to a "court" not to arbitrators. Further, 
Subsection (3) specifically creates a substantive rule of 
evidence (as does §70A-2-724), whereas the Commercial Arbi-
tration Rules of the American Arbitration Association 
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[The Rules applicable under the General Arbitration Clause 
of paragraph 12 of the Dealership Agreement, a copy of which 
is appended hereto as Appendix B], Rule 32 specifically states: 
"The Arbitrator shall be the judge of the 
relevancy and materiality of the evidence 
offered and conformity to legal rules of 
evidence shall not be necessary," 
Docutel respectfully requests that this Court exer-
cise its discretion in taking judicial notice of the Arbi-
tration Rules. 
In this respect Rule 32, applicable under paragraph 12, 
and §70A-2-723(3), applicable under paragraph 10, are in 
direct conflict if credit claims are subject to arbitration 
under paragraph 12. 
Section 70A-2-709 is encaptioned "Action for the price" 
and provides in part: 
"(2) Where the seller sues for the price 
he must hold for the buyer any goods which 
have been identified to the contract and 
are still in his control except that if 
resale becomes possible he may resell them 
at any time prior to the collection of the 
judgment. The net proceeds of any such 
resale must be credited to the buyer and 
payment of the judgment entitles him to any 
goods not resold." (emphasis added) 
Subsection (2) refers to a suit and to judgments not to hear-
ings or to awards. Section 70A-2-709 like §70A-2-703, in-
corporated into paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement, 
clearly contemplates litigation not arbitration. 
The remedies available to a secured party in Utah, 
as incorporated into paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement, 
are contained in U.C.A., 1953, §§70A-9-501 through 70A-9-507. 
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Those provisions like the remedy provisions under the Sales 
section of the U.C.C. contemplate litigation not arbitration. 
Section 70A-9-50M1) provides in part: 
" (1) When a debtor is in default under a 
security agreement, a secured party has the 
rights and remedies provided in this 
part and except as limited by subsection 
(3) those provided in the security agreement. 
He may reduce his claim to judgment, fore-
close or otherwise enforce the security in-
terest by any available judicial procedure." 
Section 70A-9-501(5) provides: 
"(5) When a secured party has reduced his 
claim to judgment the lien of any levy which 
may be made upon his collateral by virtue of 
any execution based upon the judgment shall 
relate back to the date of the perfection of 
the security interest in such collateral. A 
judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is 
a foreclosure of the security interest by 
judicial procedure within the meaning of this 
section, and the secured party may purchase 
at the sale and thereafter hold the collateral 
free of any other requirements of this chapter.," 
Section 70A-9-501(1) incorporated into the Dealership 
Agreement by paragraph 10 permits Respondent to "reduce 
[its] claim to judgment" and to "foreclose or otherwise en-
force the security interest by any judicial procedure." 
Subsection 5 explains the effect of a lien and judicial sale 
of the collateral obtained in judicial proceedings. 
Section 70A-9-503 specifies the remedies available to 
Docutel with respect to possession of collateral. That 
section provides in part: 
"Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has 
on default the right to take possession of 
the collateral. In taking possession a sec-
ured party may proceed without judicial 
process if this can be done without breach 
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of the peace or may proceed by action,.. 
If a secured party elects to proceed by process 
of law he may proceed by writ of replevin 
or otherwise, (emphasis added) 
Under paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement which in-
corporates §70A-9-503, Docutel has the right to proceed 
"by action" (i.e. judicial process) to recover possession 
of the collateral and has the right to proceed by "writ of 
replevin" in a "process of law". 
The Dealership Agreement in paragraph 10 carved 
out of the general arbitration language of paragraph 12 
the limited area of credit claims and provided for litiga-
tion of those claims with the full remedies available under 
the U.C.C. and with the applicable judicial protection and 
special rules of evidence. Systems and Brady are in error 
in arguing that "Arbitrators, just as much as courts, can 
offer relief under the Uniform Commercial Code," (Appellants 
Brief, p. 25). Arbitration proceedings do not provide the 
special rules of evidence found in such provisions as 
§70A-2-723(3) and 70A-2-724 U.C.A.; nor can arbitrators grant 
writs of replevin under §70A-9-503; nor can arbitrators pro-
vide the protection afforded the debtor under the U.C.C. 
if a secured party abuses its security rights. The U.C.C. 
as adopted by Utah, provides a detailed scheme of remedies 
affording protection to both the debtor and the creditor. 
Part and parcel of that scheme is the supervision and pro-
tection of the courts. The Dealership Agreement considered 
such rights and remedies to be sufficiently important that 
it carved out of the general arbitration language of 
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paragraph 12, the special procedures with respect to credit 
claims under paragraph 10. 
The parties provided specific procedures for credit 
claims separate from the general arbitration provision of 
paragraph 12. The agreement is not ambiguous and in this 
respect Docutel has never conceded that it was. There is no 
need to go outside the four corners of the agreement to 
determine its intent which is clearly that credit claims 
are not arbitrable. Brady's affidavits to the contrary are 
not admissable under the parol evidence rule; were not 
properly before the trial court in connection with the order 
appealled herein; and are not properly part of the record 
before this Court. 
Paragraph 10 is a specific provision relating to dis-
putes with respect to credit claims and under established 
precedent prevails over the general arbitration language, 
including any reference therein to a "provisional remedy" from 
a court of law. Both Judges Wilkinson and Greene reached 
the same basic conclusion which Docutel submits this Court 
should affirm, that credit claims are not arbitrable. 
VII. BRADY IS NOT ENTITLED TO ARBITRATION UNDER HIS 
PERSONAL GUARANTY 
Both the Old and New UAA require that there must be 
a written agreement between the parties before the court can 
order arbitration. U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-3; §78-31-1. The 
Personal Guaranty under which Brady is sued below (R. 9) 
contains no such arbitration agreement. 
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The Personal Guaranty specifically provides that 
Docutel may maintain an action against Brady without 
first suing Systems• To prevent Docutel from maintaining 
an action against Brady even if the credit claims under 
the Dealership Agreement are subject to arbitration would 
be to make the language of the Personal Guaranty illusory. 
VIII. REPLY TO MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES 
Brady and Systems in a shotgun attack on the proceed-
ings below allege that the trial court committed reversal 
error by: 
1) Failing to apply the FAA to the Dealership 
Agreement (Appellants1 Brief, p. 31, para. 35); 
2) Failing to file findings of fact and conclusions 
of law (Appellants1 Brief, p. 41); 
3) Failing to approve a statement of proceedings 
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 45); and 
4) By failing to apply 'an issue-by-issuef analysis 
of the dispute below (Appellants' Brief, p. 48). 
If it was error for the trial court not to apply the FAA 
it was error invited by Brady and Systems who have steadfastly 
insisted that they "reserved the federal issue for the fed-
eral courts" (R. 15, para. 7; R. 24; Appellants' Brief, 
Appendix A4 7, 11 13-16). This Court could hardly reverse the 
trial court for failing to apply a statute which the complain-
ing party refused to put before the court. 
Systems and Brady complain that the trial court refused 
to prepare findings of fact or conclusions of law. Brady and 
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Systems failed to file with the district court proposed 
findings of fact or conclusions of law as required by Rule 
4 of the Rules of Practice in the Third Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah. Secondly, in fact the June 10, 
1985 order at pages 2 and 3, lines 20-28 and 1-2 inclusive 
does contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Finally, Systems and Brady brought their motion before 
Judge Wilkinson under Rule 12(b) U.R.C.P. (R. 22), the motion 
before the court was not a U.C.A. §78-31a-4 motion for an 
order to arbitrate. Under the circumstances the court 
was correct in its July 19, 1985 order (Re 200) that it was 
not required under Rule 12(b) and Rule 52(b) U»RoCeP. to 
make such findings of fact and conclusions of lawc 
Whether or not the trial court erred in failing to 
approve a statement of proceedings under Rule 11 U.ReA.P<>, 
the appropriate way to raise that issue is by way of a 
petition for Writ of Mandamus under Rule 65(B) U.R.C.P. and 
Rule 19 U.R.A.P. 
Other than the July 19, 198 5 order resulting from the 
June 21, 1985 hearing [which was properly rejected because 
no appeal was pending], no orders were entered below either 
approving or refusing to approve a statement of proceedings. 
Having failed to obtain a definitive ruling below or to 
file a Rule 19 petition, Systems and Brady cannot complain 
that a statement of proceedings has not been approved. The 
proposed statement of proceedings (R. 142-160; R. 264-309) 
having not been approved is not properly before this Court. 
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Brady and Systems complain that the court failed to 
apply an "issue-by-issue" analysis of the various issues 
between Docutel and Systems and Brady. Whether or not a 
court is required to engage in such an analysis in a proper 
case, the fact is that Brady and Systems never properly 
requested such relief from the trial court. The orders 
complained of were orders entered in response to a motion 
to dismiss the complaint or to stay the proceedings filed 
under Rule 12(b) U.R.C.P. and from a motion to clarify the 
June 10, 198 5 order on that motion. The original motion 
made no request for such an issue by issue determination 
nor did the motion to clarify the decision (R. 102). Since 
the proceedings resulting in the June 10, 198 5 order did 
not involve issues suggested in the motion to clarify 
decision (R. 102) and no evidence thereof was presented or 
argued, the July 19, 1985 order properly affirmed the June 10, 
1985 order. In any event, as pointed out above, neither 
motion properly raised §78-31a-4 even if that section re-
quired an "issue-by-issue" determination which is by no means 
conceded by Docutel. 
IX. DOCUTEL, UNLIKE BRADY AND SYSTEMS, IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL AND IN THE 
RELATED APPEAL IN DOCKET NO. 20783 UNDER PARAGRAPH 
10 OF THE DEALERSHIP AGREEMENT AND UNDER RULE 33 
U.R.A.P. 
Brady and Systems originally asked the federal court to 
determine whether Docutelfs credit claims were subject to 
arbitration under the Dealership Agreement (R. 15, para. 7). 
When they were referred to the trial court below by Federal 
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Judge Jenkins, they asked the trial court under Rule 12(b) 
U.R.C.P. and U.C.A. 78-31-1 et seq., to dismiss the pro-
ceedings below or to stay its proceedings pending arbitra-
tion on the grounds that credit claims were arbitrable 
under the Dealership Agreement. When Judge Wilkinson ruled 
that credit claims were not arbitrable under the agree-
ment, they next turned to Federal Judge Greene and asked 
him to again interpret the Dealership Agreement claiming 
that they never submitted their FAA claim to the trial court 
below. When Judge Greene, like Judge Wilkinson, inter-
preted the Dealership Agreement to exclude credit claims, 
Brady and Systems then turned to this Court asking it to 
again interpret the Dealership Agreement with respect to 
credit claims [all other claims being enjoined from litiga-
tion by Federal Judge Greene] on the grounds that Judge 
Wilkinson did not grant an order compelling arbitration under 
U.C.A., 1953, §78-31a-4 even though no such request had ever 
been properly brought before the trial court; and on the 
further grounds that the trial court failed to apply federal 
law even though Brady and Systems steadfastly maintained be-
fore the trial court that "all federal issues had been re-
served for federal determination". 
Finally Brady and Systems prosecute this appeal knowing 
that the FAA supersedes the UAA and that this Court cannot 
enter any orders in conflict with the FAA which in the 
context of this very case has been interpreted by a federal 
district court, at Brady and System's request, to exclude 
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credit claims from arbitration, 
Brady and System's motivation in bringing this appeal 
is apparent and so far successful. Under the Federal Orders 
the trial court below was to determine if in fact any 
credit agreements existed between the parties, and if so 
then, litigation on those credit claims could go forward. 
By this appeal, Brady and Systems have blocked the effective-
ness of Judge Greene's order and they have delayed the pro-
ceedings below. The timing of Systems and Brady's action is 
instructive. Judge Greene announced his decision that credit 
claims were not arbitrable from the bench on June 27, 1985. 
On June 28, 198 5 Docutel filed its notice of taking of de-
position of Richard Brady (R. 135) scheduled for July 8, 1985; 
on July 2, 198 5 at Systems and Brady's request Brady's de-
position was continued to August 5, 1985 (R. 170); Docutel 
filed a notice to produce documents (R. 171) and a notice of 
deposition under Rule 30(b)(6) U.R.C.P.; on July 9, 1985 
Systems and Brady filed their notice of appeal in Docket 2078 3 
knowing that Judge Wilkinson had not yet reduced to writing 
his ruling on their objection to the June 10, 1985 order 
and used the appeal as grounds to refuse discovery (R. 251-295). 
Systems and Brady's appeal herein is both frivolous and inter-
posed for delay. Docutel is entitled to costs and attorney's 
fees herein under Rule 33 U.R.A.P. 
Paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement between the 
parties herein provides for an award of attorney's fees to 
Docutel upon litigation of credit claims. Where the parties 
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have agreed by contract to the payment of attorney's fees, 
the court may award reasonable fees in accordance with 
the terms of the parties' agreement, Turtle Management, 
Inc. v Haggis Management, Utah 645 P. 2d 667 (1982), and 
fees may be awarded on appeal, Management Services 
v Development Assoc, Utah 617 P. 2d 406 (1980) . 
Systems and Brady also seek fees under Rule 33 U.R.A.P. 
Brady and Systems problem with Rule 33 is that they them-
selves filed this appeal. The last thing Docutel has 
sought in this matter is delay, and it can hardly be said 
that its core position that credit claims are not arbitrable 
is frivolous where two judges, one federal and the other 
state, have agreed with that position. 
X. CONCLUSION 
This appeal should be dismissed, Docutel awarded its 
costs and the matter remitted to the trial court to determine 
attorney's fees awardable to Docutel under this and Appeal 
Docket No. 20783. 
Dated: November 21, 1985 
Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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APPENDIX "A" 
FEDERAL ORDERS 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
>Ct 
X 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISIO.. J /,. 
In the Matter of the Arbitration 
betwen DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
8-i <* J 
\ ^ 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-280G 
The ^bove entitled matter came before the Court on the 
27th day of June 1985, at the hour of 3:00 p.m.; Lynn G. Foster 
and John R. Meirkling appeared for Petitioners and Gordon R. 
McDowell appealed for Respondent; the Court considered the 
memoranda and documents filed by the parties and heard extensive 
argument of counsel, after which the matter was submitted to the 
Court for decision and taken under advisement. The Court now 
being fully advised, and having entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, enters the following Order: 
1. Docutel-Olivetti Corporation, Dick Brady Systems, 
Inc+ and Richard Brady, their agents, employees, successors, 
assigns and attorneys are hereby restrained and enjoined from 
proceeding in litigation in either Federal or State Courts as to 
any and all disputes between the parties arising under the 
Dealership Agreement or pertaining in any manner to the 
?1?-l£L>^ =^ b= 
dealership created thereby, including to the extent appl icable 
</ i a HU M win J i mi in i I in I HI iisserts against Systems and Brady under the 
First and Second Causes of Action set forth in D o c u t e l N 
Complaint, pendinc . * ne Third Judicial District Court in and 
!i01: bait L-ak' " £ lil.-il'i Civil No C8 5-5 0 6
 f except jtcp 
the extent that the relief sought thereunder shall be ruled by 
the said state court Lu te based upon claims under separate 
credit agreements fo*- ^ \ . . *- therwise 
pursuant to paragraph *0 of the Dealership Agreement. The 
parties are e r ^ i f ^ ceedlng further In litigation in the 
aforesaid Sta^e Coi.:\ Compj.ai.nt as to the Third cause of ac tioi ) 
set forth theie:- >ocutel may proceed in State Court as to the 
Fourth Cau?^ o: A;: i, - - : ,s ,: ftsaio ' ^ t e Court 
Complaint a- ^j-ihorized by paragraph 1 • c i the Dealership 
Agreement -i snail De construed to prohibit any 
party from pursuing litigation remedies for enforcement i c igrits 
arising under t Me Dealership Agreement, or rights under the 
personal guara. . -,' • • * d\ J - - ion with ary award 
which may :>^  reduced to judgment pL.-sunnt t .- arbitration 
I"u" i H-'eed i n o s 
The parties, - i<~r?d 
to proceed to arbitration as to all disputes and ^iaiiii^ axi±.i:g 
"jr I'-.'j M » i n-i'i h i «• h i | in r Mt »IIH-MII or " d i m r ^ in u ., m a n n e r tj t h p 
dealership created oy the Dealership Agreement, including to the 
extent applicable the First and Second Causes of Action, a^5 the 
claims set tort! dir: *~h^ -end in? 
case in state court, Civil No. 8 5-506. 
-?-
3. Except as provided herein, it- is ordered that 
hearings and proceedings between the parties in arbitration as to 
disputes and claims arising under or pertaining in any manner to 
the dealership created by the Dealership Agreement as set forth 
at paragraph 12 therein, shall be held and take place within the 
District of Utah. Effective August 20, 1985, unless this Court 
grants Respondent's pending Motion to Stay, it is ordered that 
all issues between the parties currently in arbitration elsewhere 
shall be transferred to the District of Utah and consolidated 
with the issues and matters which this Court has placed in 
arbitration in the District of Utah pursuant to this Order. 
4. No costs or attorney's fees are awarded herewith 
to any party. 
DATED: August O , 1985. 
• rsA^c^g 
GREENE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
cc: 
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J''I J ',1 i III i, i A«!*)•:s D I S T R I C T COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Arbitration 
between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., -^- A^^U £% 
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, 
rul.jf loners, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
. ' vs. 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, Civil No. C85-280G 
Defend a i it. 
. ^ v 
The atnivp entitled matter* having come before the Court 
on the 2 7th day of June i"ili' i1 U K ? h u m of 3:00 p.m, ( Lynn G. 
Foster and John R. Merkliriq appearing for Petitioners and Gordon 
Ft,, McDowe i 1. d|i|.)*:»d t i IIM lor Responds - t- Court having 
considered the memoranda and documents f u e J by the parties -^ nd 
r.vi*w;q r - - • : - ~ r aumer t <* --f counsel, and being fully advised iz 
the premises makes . *.*ig: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
i il ! in i in in ! i in i i i i r "i s d i c t i o n ( ? v e r t "u 5 m a t t e r 
pursuant t • * the provisions ul iili U, j 1 1 ' ' --,.•>, 
citizenship between the parties exists and the jurisdictional 
amount m contruvei •; > m- I , 
2, On or a hour r.he 22nd day of February 1982, 
Pot 1 1 ju»i"ii 1 i' L HiMKiv S/stems, Inc. I "'Systems'1) and Olivett.i 
Corporation, tl le predecessor m ui'e. 
Olivetti Corporation ("Docutel"), entered into a Dealership 
Agreement dated February 17, 1982, providing for arbitration. 
Docutel is the successor in interest to Olivetti Corporation 
under the Dealership Agreement. A copy of the said Dealership 
Agreement is attached to these Findings. 
3. Interstate commerce transactions between one party 
(Systems) located in the State of Utah and another party located 
outside of the State of Utah have occurred pursuant to the 
Dealership Agreement. 
4. On or about February 17, 1982, Richard Brady 
executed a personal guaranty with respect to indebtedness of 
Systems to Olivetti Corporation, which inures to the benefit of 
Docutel as successor in interest of Olivetti Corporation. 
5. On or about January 24, 1985, Docutel filed an 
action against Systems and Richard Brady in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case 
No. C85-506, alleging four causes of action. A copy of the 
Complaint in the aforesaid action is attached to these Findings. 
6. Systems and Richard Brady filed a Demand for 
Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on March 8, 
1985, asserting certain claims therein against Docutel. 
Thereafter, Brady and Systems have demanded that Docutel submit 
all claims, controversies and disputes to arbitration which 
Docutel may have against Systems and/or Brady arising out of or 
in any way related to the Dealership created by the Agreement. 
-2-
1 . In i mil I I 11»1 , refused or failed to submit all of its 
claims, controversies and disputes In »;u bi I' i a I J ".HI. Docutel has 
taken the pcsi* ;-^  *fv-r v:;-* compelled :o assert claims 
against Richa ••' ?r otherwise if it does not 
want to pursue those claims, but *b ** . /d« 
m I I x-eedinqr relating zs certain claims against or 
asserted by Systems. 
Ht On Mdy H, 1985, Judge Hompr F. Wilkinson, the 
Utah int-Mi'^r « j-il"i* assiqned t-o t-he state court action 
aforesaid, denied Systems1 and Richard hsr^*iy «, w|, » JI.J, rn Ks'niss 
*.'•-•' ' ^if-la ml aad refused to enjoin its prosecution pending 
arbit talion, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
;rvrr ff,e f/,tpqo!nq Findings of Fact the Court enters 
the following Conclusions of Law: 
•'he disputes between Docutel and Systems under 
paragraph vditisi,, ^reement are subject to the 
Federal Arbitration Act* 
*ichard Brady J9 subvert to the Federal 
Arbitration As: .. - *-he sarr..:- -_-* -ems relative to the 
disputes between the parties. Since Docutel has alleged that 
Systems i t Richard Brady, and that l:-iDi.lify is 
coterminous, it; is estoppe.. . - . * the 
Art re Richard Brady. 
3. p a r a g x . iei's»*'ip Aqreement requires 
arbitration .: .i.l disputes between the parties arising 
t .. - A H ai'xy manner tu the dealership created 
- 3 -
thereby, but certain matters and the pursuit of certain remedies 
are specifically governed by Paragraph 10 of the said Dealership 
Agreement and such are not required to be arbitrated• 
4. The parties, including Richard Brady, should 
proceed to arbitration as to disputes arising under the 
Dealership Agreement or pertaining in any way to the dealership 
created thereby, under the terms of Paragraph 12 of the 
Dealership Agreement, including to the extent applicable claims 
which Docutel asserts against Systems and Brady under the First 
and Second causes of action, and the claims set forth in the 
Third cause of action, in Docutel's Complaint pending in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah. The parties are enjoined from proceeding further 
in litigation in state court as to the First and Second causes of 
action, except to the extent that those causes of action by court 
order of the said state court shall be ruled to be based upon 
separate credit agreements for collection of unpaid accounts or 
otherwise pursuant to paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement. 
The parties are enjoined from proceeding further in litigation in 
the aforesaid State Court Complaint as to the Third Cause of 
Action set forth therein. Docutel may proceed in State Court as 
to the Fourth Cause of Action set forth in the aforesaid State 
Court Complaint as authorized by paragraph 10 of the Dealership 
Agreement. 
5. Except as provided herein, all present and future 
disputes under the Dealership Agreement or pertaining in any way 
to the dealership created thereby, as described at Paragraph 12 
-4-
ol I' lii:.1 Deaxej -
proceedings relating thereto shall be held and take place within 
thtt District; of Utah. The parties should transfer all issues 
arising under Paragraph 1 ?. currently in arbi.trat.ion elsewner> > 
the District of Utah. 
't-,i»: ' ^ _ f 1 < 5 8 5 . 
10MAS GREENE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT mi INT 
-5-
Nd war MAOY i ^ •T"r'y(0,,n-?c'»^''i(»9Jro!i»ettr 
: an individual U a partnmhip &Z J T * / 
<t-r , 4t; * ; *-*•'•—*—. corporation 
UT
*» Cf«l?A . £6/ « / • BW/ 
SKIT £>W£ CITY 
* ^ t ^ * * ••*«*««••••••+ 
I. 
rDcalcr-) * * * * * 
• Mi.ctti appoint* Dealer 4% an authorized dealer for the 
s*U'» leasing, rental and servicing of the Olivetti m.r 
chine* *<: forth 05 the whcdule(s) attached hereto an J 
accessories, parts and supplies therefor fthc 'Prod 
iM%" I in 1 he gcogrjphlc area set forth in the schedule!*) 
attached ^^o"(lt|ie^"Tcrritory##) commencing on the 
date thi\ Agrccihcptss csecutcd by Olivetti. The deal-
gisht> created by lhj». Agreement shatlcontinue in effect 
iintil icrmifuted Ky; ()fivrtti or Dealer in accord;uvc 
nith the term* of this Agreement. Olivetti and Dealer 
.•gtec to 4* t in a fair and equitable manner to each other 
and in en J user* of the Product*. 
t iir.etti shall tOday* prior toe.*ch ammcrsai > o! 
the commencement date assign Dealer a mutuall) ag-
reeable annual quota for purchase of Product* from 
Oli%vtti during the succeeding >car in order foi Dcolei 
M retain the dealership created h> this Agreement 
Such quota ihall he set forth in a nc» *chcdulc(sj which 
shall f>c p.i?t cf this Agreement. Quoias for nc* PIIKI 
u t \ * ill rv established at the time of introduction %•? 
su*h heshkls FiiIliHrncnt of qut'ta K essential to ihi* 
Jcakr%h;p Failure ol*Dc jlcr toacluctc <W« oliis .»nnu.«t 
quota during an> %on\CCutite *i% month period n*ay be 
treated bj Gliu'tti as an event of default Othci %Jcs 
g»ul\ %n incentive* will tv csubJuhed from time 10 t«m* 
m u»nfHv t*»n with contests and sales achievement club* 
• Mi%ettt rcscrso the right to negotiate «JU .igicc 
locut »*:*. national or gitsernmcnt accounts for the 
% A . Ic**» rental %*i set v kc of the Products in tne lei 
luory. Oinctt; ma> assign to Dealer that portion of 
any account which presides for sale, leatc. rent:*1 
i«t \er%Ke of the IVodoets in the Territor) Deal." 
•igrees to.KVept su„h assignment and to perform such 
contrail. 
t 
Dratcr shall do everything possible actively and con-
tinually to promote and encourage the sale, leasing, 
rental and servicing of the Product* In the Territory 
In particular. Dealer shall establish and maintain an 
*di«{uatr number of service locations staffed with a 
rra*nn»lile number of competent, trained personnel 
and maintain an adequate inventory of spare part* to 
a«*urr prurnpt service Dealer shall perform any 
Olivetti warranty service applicable to the Product* 
used in the Territory. If Dealer sells any Products which 
are used wirhia the warranty period outside of the Ter 
rr.ory. Deafer shall compensate the installing Olivetti 
location in accordance *ith the current delivery and 
installation policy established by Olivetti for installa«. 
t!on. training and warranty service* 
Olivetti will use ii» best efforts to maintain an 
adequate supply of spjre parts for the Products* but 
shall not be rc*pon*iM* for events beyond its control. 
1 
Deafer will conduct the dealership created by (this 
Ajjri-emrni for it* tmr.-ai '•nunt. It ta onderntixnd that 
Pealvr ha# no autlu«ri:% to'oblijfafi* Olivetti for any 
liability relatinir t»i thr draleiihip or the Product*. 
4. 
Oliwtti %%U!
 M •; ; ,ni .*•• il»?r %%i!l purchase. t.V Pn«d 
\Mt* in aaori!ann **.:. thi* ti^ rnin anrf c»mdi:iMn* of 
thu .Agreemem iiti%*:. uit! gi%e Dealer thirti l.toii 
d.o •' p H t m«u e ••• .•?. -Klein* in prices 
S 
(Hurtti ^ratit* IV^Jr' t licence tc# us* it« registered 
t f ^ i r m r l .tn»l tr.»H» -..itnv "Olivetti* in conri'-vtMin 
won thr ri«*alfr'h»p err urd by thit* Agreement, but 
onlv in a< n*rd;inrte %i ••:.•. :h# ifuidrlinef and direction* 
' I ~ . I H C . I I N .-^N-rriir. • nisrttt Dealer shall n«»t udd 
tu.f«ldit%*rati«. dr^ii*- *r r-move anv brand, trademark 
••r •.-••a." ;niii;!»::
 %.iiii*,te .11 the m.whine or p.tclapn^ 
:h.:c-.»r IXaici j%ltu~t<J£C\ that the trademark and 
u^te n;:ipc Oli%etti j:e esiremefy %aluahle.i*Mrt*of 
otnetu and that *m:h lnen%e grants Dealer accc%* to 
Oloitn * % Jumble gi^O »ill. Olivetti may at any time 
obi.vt i*»a specific applvation of any Olnetti trademark 
t*i uJJC name. In sucr* -•" event. Dealer will cean* m:ik* 
ing siwh application ot the trademark or trade name 
immediaf elv The liccr.<e created by this paragraph shall 
let min.ite ,M«I••fruiic.it!> at the same time as the tci inina* 
tionorihedral%*rshipcreitedby this Agreement Dealer 
shjll ruu a%quire. and specifically disclaims, any other 
right m such trademark or tr*df name or any right in any 
other Olivetti trademark or trade name and shall not use 
w\ Olivetti trademark c trade name or part theteof as • 
port of the business name of its company. 
6. 
Dtal-r ma> :.••! .isfifr. # transfer, voluntarily ur by 
nprration ..f law. hv means of merger, consolid.itiunt 
iale of a » c U or trar.'fer of control by transft r of 
shares at otherwise, all ur any part of Its interest in or 
^ligation* under thi« Agreement without thr prinr 
written con«4*nt of Olivetti and any such attempted 
alignment or Jelt
 4:.«;..*n shall IH* null und snid'Such 
consent shall not U* unrea«onahl\ withheld. 
P Y t t T B T I * • » • 
•« .« • •««•« .« m—*m 
relating to varitus matters, including, but not lim-
•ted ut« new product** national account** government 
iMOmnlft, interterritnml transfer!, servicing Man 
&*d%. prices tranvfcr of deliver y and installation fen. 
w%* of in*derrurk<. advertising (suck as Yellow Pape\> 
and Mir fufoKhtng %rf general market information to 
Olivetti. Jt is understood and agreed that such manuals, 
letter* *nd bulletins shall be part of this Agreement, and 
%hatt he returneJ to Olivetti upon termination of the 
.dealership. 
s> 
IVali*r ••greri tn use and abide by the tcrm> and 
«MrtditMa* of Olivetti purchase order forms and in-
wicm H turn purchasing the Products 
Dealer iigrees that Olivetti retains the entire pro* 
prtefcirv rights and title to any software which it 
provide tn Dealer, Olivetti mere!/ conveys a non-ci* 
elu*ivv. nen»transferrable* license to pealer and it* 
rtf*tamt*r» tn u.«e such Mift ware in connection wit h t he 
I'rodut i> That license does not include the right to 
publish nr licence such software to other* or to u.^ if 
fur rnn-t Uivetti hardware. 
to. 
Dealer hciybv prantv Oliverti a tecuntv intcrcM o 
ull Olivetti brand ei)uipment and inventor) which 
Deak't presently 0* n* nr may hereafter acquire and any 
i*ddili«*n% ISI a%\*c*v!on% thereto mJ the pioeccd* 
there**1*. Deafer authorize* Otivttti to sign and file 
l°iit.tfvitiv* *!.itcmcnt% in t.n%v ol Olivetti. Upon request. 
(Vales -|:uv»iv»ctceutc *uchtinancin; statementsi ll 
;m e%%-n: MI default by Dtjler occurs under an> cred»i 
*t*t%\-»«, nt Mith^Ni%%-tti.Clliveilimj)..inioiif oitk-i n m 
cdicv i«v;*»l itself ut anv remedy in effect no* 01 *t iiv 
time %•« det.i-.it! unJci th% t mform Commercial C\slc *•• 
am Mtr;l;« statute. In the event Olivetti succewtull> 
hf §n§>U*fa!.ietionapiiHt Deafer fur ihectdlccti%»nor:it 
unpa*! ;*%viint. Dejler agree* to pay all reavoruHe 
eollceti.»ftet*vt* and legal cvpcnvc* includingreasonable 
atu*iH'v\tcc* 
11 
Fithvi p^ft> m;i> terminate the dealership created tn 
thi* A|:iecment at any time for violation of the termv of 
ttciv Agu'cmvnt upon thirty t.tth d.t>v* prioi »rmen 
it*!*? n*m hy certified mail, return receipt requested. 
«nile%% ilnr IHIIUUMI i> cured wtihin voch thirt)»day 
f« ,-risl 
l l , - • -
\fl depute* anting vnJtt thiv Agreement or pertaining 
iii an% nun »er t%* the dealership created hy thit Af ree-
moit *hatt be roolved hy arbitration by an Appeal 
BiMid in accordance with the then-current Commercial 
Arbitration Kutctof the American Arbitration Atuvia-
t»tn r \ *.A"l The Appeal Doard shall constat of 
Ihice members one appointed by Olivetti, one which 
m.i% K appointed bv the National Office Machine 
Dealer* A%MK'iatvn. upon request of Dealer, and, if 
required, one appointed bv the A.A.A. The arbitration 
hearing shall be conducted at the regional office of 
*nu i ieaier agree HfHHi a different location. The fact that 
Olivetti or Dealer may obtain a fwtsfonal remedy from 
a court of law prior to. or during the course of. the 
arbitration tearing shall not be deemed a waiver nf 
arbitration or deprive the Appeal Board of jurisdiction 
over the itt*;*i!f |*utgm«>nt fiifHMi the award rendered by 
the Appeal board may be entered in any court having 
jut iNjtction thereof. 
If the Appeal Board finds in favor of Olivetti. 
Dealer vlult pay «he fee* and etpenses of the Appeal 
Board 
ll the Afi^al I W d finds ill favor of Dealer, 
Olitrtti vtult pay the frev and eipenses of the Appeal 
Board 
13. 
Olivetti shall not be liable to Dealer for failure to 
make delivery of the Products when due to any cause 
or event hevnnd Olivet! iV reasonable control. In such 
event. Olivetti may eancel the orderfs) or extend the 
period fo« performance in the citenl of the delay 
occavkMted thereby Olivetti wilt notify Dealer of any 
caneclUion \*(w ivdcr and u*c itvbestefforts to notify 
Dealer of any delay in delivery 
1*. 
I h . * • %*i , i*»iiIB«.,.::: . m J al l . - .. 9.*I:.;MII. m^ %vhedule eon^ti 
tute the eniiif \grcemcne between the parties and 
Mtper*cdc all e«»ntem{>*s.«ne4HK and previous agrer° 
ment* related to the sarw vub;ect malterc 
15. 
Thi< .i^rrf moot shall U* t»tn«!ing upon0 and inure iu 
\hi- (vnrfit of01 he re?p^ctivr H* ir.%0 l?eneficiarirsie pvf* 
w*n:e? representatives. «uee .^<or<i and assignf of th%e 
partis*, eifi'pt a^nthrrwu^e hrrrin provided... If may 
ib»t U* nunUtwd or arm-mlrd vtirpt in wraling. si^md 
bv a Holy amh^rired ftprrsmtativ* of thf party to be 
tv«»ftd. Onu ihc President. i»i a Vice President"^hall be 
deet^ u'd „i duly authorized icprcvenlatitc of Olivetti. 
IN W I T N E S S WIIK.HKOF. i h r p n r t i c s h a w 
caused this A g r e e m e n t to be e x e c u t e d a s of 
the dat^-fjr/l a u i v c wr i t ten . 
OLiVkyn conroRATioN 
/- • 
Da«« 6r£>.J.y. Bl^} 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
State Bar No. 2180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, RICHARD BRADY, 
DOES 1 THRU 10 WHOSE IDENTITIES 
ARE UNKNOWN, 
D o f "^  P. d n r *r s 
I 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C 85*~S~0(* 
Plaintiff for its Complaint alleges: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff Docutel Olivetti Corporation is a corporation 
and the successor by merger to Olivetti Corporation of America. 
Hereinafter Plaintiff shall be referred to as "Docutel" or "Plain-
» tiff. 
!; 2. Docutel is qualified to do business and is *oir.^  busir.csr. 
ji 
J as a foreign corporation in Utah, 
»t 
j| 3. Defendant Dick Brady Systems, Inc. ("DBS'* hereinafter) xs 
8 
| a Utah corpora t ion doing bu^inesu in S a l t Lake County, Utah. 
4 . Richard Brady ("Brady" h e r e i n a f t e r ) i s an i n d i v i d u a l p r e s i d i n g in Sa l t Lake County, Utah and i s the P r e s i d e n t of DBS. 
« 
!» 5. The identity and status of Defendants DOES 1 through 10 
is unknown to Plaintiff at this time. A€ such time as Plaintiff 
I determines the identity and status of DOES 1 through 10 Plaintiff 
^ o z 
U4 */°» CD 
*§£ 
« r* u 2
- . hU 
~ ± * 
g o : 
O S S 
I  I s h a l l i « / ; t -fcSi3 O w r siid ifca Compiaint t o i n c l u d e t h e t rue 
2 1 names of the de fendant s . 
3 } Defendants DOES 1 through 10 a r e o f f i c e r s , directors 
4 I o r shareho lders of DBS, 
/ 5 I 7 . fm i t ' b r u a r y 1 n" I! "Hi! I m1 linn u l e l i iml 1Mb M I M P I W I JI i n HI 
6 j O l i v e t t i Corporation Dealer^grppmqpt ("Agreement" h e r e i n a f t e r ^ 
! x u e and c o r r e c t copy of which i s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o a s E x h i b i t M.V 
^^SJLand i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n . 
9 Jnder the Agreement, Docutel d e l i v e r e d p r o d u c t s t o DBS 
I 
10 | and E- -
1 .-* breached the Agreement by failing to make payments 
^
 n LO DOCutex axi 10 Docutel's damages of not less than $49,252.60. 
13,| 10., The Agreement provides for ch.j payment -J'2 W\J:J ,i;id -JX-
P
' D O T S O ? G J 
duo: 
1 OH r: , c A ,«.. 1 inquont ' i ? ?oun t r i n c l u d i n g 3 r e a s o n a b l e 
16 J sum o * c 
17 ". 
II 
A re».t Sv.- *rn> i r- 3 • r.-»x n e 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1& 
li 
1 1. P a r a g r a p h s 1 t h r o u g h 10 of t h i s Compla in t a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d 
19 «herein bv r e f e r e n c e . 
i 
2 0 ;i 1 2 . Or 1 5 el »r tja r y II ; J 982 Br ady s i g n e d a P e r s o n a l G u a r a n t y 
21 !; g u a r a n t y i n g t h e o b l i g a t i o n s t c > Docute l by DBS A t t a c h e d h e r e t o 
22 y^s Exhibj t l"li,MI" ai id j n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n i s a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy 
2 . -.> M: soi ia] G :ia 1: ai 1 ty I Ji ider 1:1 le Per sonal G\ lar ai it:.1;! Br ad; '" i s 
24 
25 
lia: \o Docutel for the debts of DBS by reason of wl nch Brady 
is indebted to Docutel 11 i the sum of $49,252,60. 
>.T. The Personal Guaranty makes Brady liable for the 
2 1 performance of all obligations of DBS. One of the obligations 
3 1 of DBS is the payment of costs and attorney's fees occassioned 
4 I by DBS's default under the Agreement. A reasonable attorney's 
5 j fee herein would be the sum of $10,000. 
6jj THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
h 
7 ;» 1 4 . Paragraphs 1 through 10 of th i i i J o m p l a i n t a r e incorpor-
i 
8 J ated herein by reference. 
9 J 15. Defendants Brady and DOES 1 through 10 are officers, 
10 I directors and owners of DBS. Docutel is informed and believes 
11 
12 
and thereon alleges that there exists a unity of interest and 
! ownership between DBS,v Johnson'* and DOES 1 through 10 such that 
13 j; the separate personalities of DBS and the individual defendants 
14 i no longer exist and that in fact DBS is the alter eqo of Brady 
IS^Tand D0ES~1 through 10. 
16 || 16. Docutel alleges that the observance of the corporate fori 
i' 
17 |, of DBS would sanction a fraud against Docutel, promote injustice OJ 
18 i would cause an inequitable result as to Docutel* As a consequence! 
•i 
19 the Court should enter its Order holding that the corporation is 
20 '• the alter ego of Brady and DOES 1 through 10 and that Brady and 
21 I DOES 1 through 10 are indebted to Docutel for all sums found due 
»• 
22 | and owing by DBS including costs of suit and attorney's fees. 
JJ 
I! 
23 •  FOURTH CAUSE Or ACTION 
i; 
24 ir 17.. Paragraphs 1 through 10, 12 through 13, and 15 through 
25 ;. 16 of this Complaint are incorporated hereby reference. 
r 
26 * 
27 j -3-
28 I 
1 
2 
3 
. 18. Paragraph 10 of th*j Agreement providei !'n *" Security 
Agreement in all Olivetti bn-\i products and proceeds therefrom, 
19 -u ui ate Agreement, Docutel is 
4 I exit Itled to immediate possession of the collateral and a judgment 
5 1 against DBS for any deficiencies resulting from liquidation 
6 I by Docutel I 1 he
 k.olla ir*. a 1 IJJ, I.J.IJU^ i.-.-sls ..I ti'ijs, •-u i .i . ' -i 
! 
7 | r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e of >l(j ,uou. 
H I l\ rsutial Guaran ty Brady i s i n d e b t e d t o 
9 j Docu te l f o r t h e sums found due and owing under P a r a g r a p h 
10 ] t h i s C o m p l a i n t . 
1 th . - '.* f- >t «:»:*-• - - rtnd Brady 
Ii 
n 
12 '• and DOBS 1 th rough is^ Brady *-i, njth i th rough 1^ . ^xe , *.ahle r o 
a t °" • -
3 | ^ 1j i, uuCyit . - - ^ ' -oand due dnd owing Docute l u n d e r P a r a g r a p h 19. 
Ud> «/» *W _ 
£ «~° X ( 
0£< 14 WHEREFORE Plaintiff oravs for -judqmen-. „•** u>,i *•*. 
° 2 D ! 
!^o> I, 
*8r, ic, •  i. On its First Cause of Action a judgment against DBS for 
a* ^* w ' 
g 5 < l 6 | t h e . s u m o f * 4 9 » 2 « n 6 0 . 
°£< I 
^ © ^ 1/1 On i t s Second Cause of Ac t ion a judgment a g a i n s t Brady 
18 jj for tnt1 !• mi i il" ii n , 252*60« 
m iJ •! On i t s Th i rd Cause of Ac t ion an u r d e i ui t i u s u ,»un m a t 
f, 
20 DBS i,r. the alter ego of Bradv and DOES i through 10 and i hat 
in 
;/I ' T ^i CKji'iiMiiH MI L inn i ii IIM i IT us ot DBS would s a n c t i o n ii f r a u d 
22 [ ' a g a i n s t D o c u t e l r promote i n j u s t i c e , o r c a u s e din j n i ' j u i i i i i n1 c ev i J i ' , 
I 
23 y and by r e a s o n the reo f Brady dini DUES 1 through J i"1 a r e i n d e b t e d t o I 
,j 
24 - Docu te l t o r a i i [ e jH i t q r a n t i d iDCiitrl i qa ins t DBS 
il 
l On i t s Four th Cause of A c t i o n , an Order ot t h i s C o u r t 
26 : ' / i / s t iiJi tiiiMj mi1! ind DOES I th rough It t o d e l x v e i t o r t h w i t h 
- 5 z 
U4 *St «o 
J o t 
r = SS 
o5< 
ec Si *-
o§5 
1 I to Docutel all collateral identif i<*^ in the Agreement and that 
2 I upon liquidation thereof Docutel shall be entitled to judgment 
3 J against DBS, Brady and DOES 1 through 10 for deficiency remaining 
4 I or liability found to exist between Docutel and DBS. 
5 I 5. On all causes of action against all defendants costs 
6 I of suit and attorney 1 s fees in the sum of $10,000. 
7 8 6. On all causes of action such other, further or additional 
8 \ relief as the Court deems appropriate under the circumstances, 
9|| DATED: January 24, 1985 
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STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL, DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Arbitration 
Between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, 
vs. 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
ORDER 
C i v i l 
/ 
/ 
•I'4 
c
^°
0
^ >x 
C85-280G 
The Respondent's Mutio u '< - -. \ a 
Stay in the at ^ *- .titled matter cam® before the Court on tn-
Foster anti Jut* •  Merkling a p p w t c u i, «. »etitionets an > : ,. 
C D ^ W H ; , i.nedrec f^ -r ^^sr^nrjpnt , t » Court considered trie 
memoranda . - * «cumenf - ' - ' ,*e 
argument c*t counsel, after which the matter was submitteu .. the 
in;.i,i^^ to t lie heretolott blaled M u d M M III I I 
and Con~) - : v - *>r . •>. . ::,<- M;r- fine C.J Jocutel-01 i\*ett i 
brou<jl'j • . ; m ^ Court ana 
proceedec r'igate matters ana Liiiriw,3 arising : rom a 
dealer agreement, - ^ t ^ H 1 < *•*-"• - ioruments betweer itself 
and del*endj e as - i 
l i a b i l x r . » . - t ., *»r' .-;, ' p4eorj , j t e ^ a v e t t j a -
| , i .1111 J 1 1 1 vuiaataixxy Sua. 
LUtrf SENT T ("I ••;• , t 
./ _ * . 1 
the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah the full scope of matters 
set forth in its Complaint, consisting of some matters which this 
Court has held to be arbitrable, as well as other matters which 
this court has held are of a non-arbitrable nature and the proper 
subject of litigation; (3) Docutel-Olivetti has submitted itself 
to the jurisdiction of this Court for a determination on the 
merits of the applicability of 9 U.S.C. Section 4 to the claims 
between the parties, and has availed itself of the jurisdiction 
of this Court by seeking affirmative relief in proceedings 
herein; and (4) the American Arbitration Association has 
indicated that there would be no substantial cost differential in 
arbitrating the arbitrable claims of the parties in Utah as 
opposed to Texas or elsewhere. The Court finds and rules that 
the above stated facts and circumstances constitute compelling 
and countervailing reasons for ordering arbitration of the 
pending arbitrable claims which have been asserted in Utah forums 
to take place in the District of Utah. The Court also finds that 
for reasons of judicial economy as well as the other compelling 
and countervailing reasons set forth herein, other pending 
arbitrable claims which have been commenced elsewhere should be 
transferred to Utah and combined with proceedings in the District 
of Utah. In view of the foregoing, the Court, being fully 
advised, and having made and reached the foregoing findings, 
enters the following Order: 
1. Respondent's Motion under Rule 59 to amend or 
alter the Court's Order of August 8, 1985, is denied. 
2. Respondent's Motion for a Stay is denied* 
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SAN FRANCISCO (94108) • CHARO S A I IXH'I U • 
445 Bush Street* (415) 981-3901 
SEATTLE (98104) • NEAL M. BLACKER • 
8 1 i First Avenue • (206) 622-6435 
SYRACUSE (13202) • DEBORAH A. BROWN • 
7 ? " Sfaie Tower Building • (315) 472-5483 
W^. i iNGTON, D.C. (20036) • GARYLEE COX • 
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N W • (202) 296-8510 
WHITE PLAINS, N.Y. (10601) • MARION J. ZINMAN • 
34 South Broadway • (9! 4 > 946 1 • '•• 
• * N A RBITRATION ASSOC! % T\OS 
M-.^ i ^ k 110020) •140 Wesf 5!*! 
,212)484-4000 
• • • • r ~ i r 
• • r * • • • • 
PB'JHHI 
« • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • I 
RULES 
Commercial 
Arbitration 
Rules 
American 
Arbitration 
Association 
As amended 
and in effect 
February /, 1984 
AAA-5-20M-6/84 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Agreement of Parties 4 
2. Name of Tribunal 4 
3. Administrator . 4 
4. Delegation of Duties 4 
5. National Panel of Arbitrators 4 
6. Office of Tribunal. 4 
7. Initiation under an Arbitration Provision 
in a Contract. 4 
8. Change of Claim. 5 
9. Initiation under a Submission 5 
10. Pre-Hearing Conference 6 
11. Fixing of Locale. 6 
12. Qualifications of Arbitrator 6 
13. Appointment from Panel. 6 
14. Direct Appointment by Parties 7 
15. Appointment of Neutral Arbitrator by Party-
Appointed Arbitrators 7 
16. Nationality of Arbitrator in International 
Arbitration. 8 
17. Number of Arbitrators 8 
18. Notice to Arbitrator of Appointment . 8 
19. Disclosure and Challenge Procedure 8 
20. Vacancies 8 
21. Time and Place . 8 
22. Representation by Counsel 9 
23. Stenographic Record 9 
24. Interpreter 9 
25. Attendance at Hearings 9 
26. Adjournments. 9 
27. Oaths. 9 
28. Majority Decision 10 
29. Order of Proceedings 10 
30. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party . . . . . . . 10 
31. Evidence 10 
32. Evidence by Affidavit and Filing ofDocuments. . . 11 
33. Inspection or Investigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
34. Conservation of Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
35. Closing of Hearings 11 
36. Reopening of Healings 12 
37. Waiver of Oral Hearings 12 
38. Waiver of Rules 12 
39. Extensions of Time 12 
40. Communication with Arbitrator and 
Serving of Notice .12 
41. Time of Award 13 
42. Form of Award . .13 
43. Scope of Award . 13 
44. Award upon Settlement 13 
45. Delivery of Award to Parties 13 
46. Release of Documents for Judicial Proceedings. .14 
47. Applications to Court and 
Exclusion of Liability 14 
48. Administrative Fees 14 
49. Fee When Oral Hearings are Waived 15 
50. Expenses 15 
51. Arbitrator's Fee 15 
52. Deposits 15 
53. Interpretation and Application of Rules 15 
EXPEDITED PROCEDURES 
54. Notice by Telephone 16 
.55. Appointment and Qualifications of Arbitrators. . 16 
56. Time and Place of Hearing 16 
57. The Hearing 16 
58. -Time of Award 17 
Administrative Fee Schedule 17 
For the Arbitration 
of future disputes:-
The American Arbitration Association recom-
mends the following arbitration clause for inser-
tion in all commercial contracts: 
STANDARD ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
Any controversy or claim arising out of or re-
lating to this contract, or the breach thereof, 
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance 
with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association, and judg-
ment upon the award rendered by the Arbi-
trators) may be entered in any Court having 
jurisdiction thereof. 
For the Submission 
of existing disputes:-
We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree to 
submit to arbitration under the Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association the following controversy: (cite 
briefly). We further agree that the above con-
troversy be submitted to (one) (three) Arbitra-
to rs ) selected from the panels of Arbitrators 
of the American Arbitration Association. We 
further agree that we will faithfully observe 
this agreement and the Rules and that we will 
abide by and perform any award rendered by 
the Arbitrators) and that a judgment of the 
Court having jurisdiction may be entered upon 
the award. 
If either party is from a country other than the 
United States, be sure to request a copy of the 
Supplementary Procedures for International Com-
mercial Arbitration. 
Commercial 
Arbitration Rules 
1 Agreement of Parties 
The parties shall be deemed to have made these 
Rules a part of their arbitration agreement when-
ever they have provided for arbitration by the 
American Arbitration Association or under its 
Rules. These Rules and any amendment thereof 
shall apply in the form obtaining at the time the 
arbitration is initiated, 
2» Name of Tribunal 
Any Tribunal constituted by the parties for the 
settlement of their dispute under these Rules shall 
be called the Commercial Arbitration Tribunal. 
3o Administrator 
When parties agree to arbitrate under these Rules, 
oi when they provide for arbitration by the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association and an arbitration is 
initiated thereunder, they thereby constitute AAA 
the administrator of the arbitration. The authority 
and obligations of the administrator are prescribed 
in the agreement of the parties and in these Rules. 
+ I telega non of Duties 
Ihf duties of the AAA under these Rules may be 
earned out through Tribunal Administrators, or 
such other officers or committees as the AAA may 
direct. 
5 National Pane! of Arbiti atoi s 
The AAA shall establish and maintain a National 
Panel of Arbitrators and shall appoint Arbitrators 
therefrom as hereinafter provided. 
6. Office of Tribunal 
The general office of a Tribunal is the headquar-
ters of the AAA, which may, however, assign the 
administration of an arbitration, to any of its Re-
gional Offices. 
Initiation under an Ailulnlimi hovisiiini 
m a Contract 
Arbitration under an arbitration provision in a con-
tract may be initiated in the following manner: 
(a) The initiating party shall give notice to the 
other party of its intention to arbitrate (Demand), 
which notice shall contain a statement setting forth 
the nature of the dispute, the amount Involved., if 
any, the remedy sought, and 
(b) By filing at any Regional Office of the AAA 
three copies of said notice, together with three 
copies of the arbitration provisions of the contract, 
together with the appropriate administrative fee 
as provided in the Administrative Fee Schedule. 
The AAA shall give notice of such filing to the other 
party. If so desired, the party upon whom the De-
mand for Arbitration is made may file an answering 
statement in duplicate with the AAA within seven 
days after notice from the AAA, in which event 
said party shall simultaneously send a copy of the 
answer to the other party. If a counterclaim is as-
serted it shall contain a statement setting forth the 
nature of the counterclaim, the amount involved, 
if any, and the remedy sought. If a monetary claim 
is made in the answer the appropriate fee provided 
in the Fee Schedule shall be forwarded to the AAA 
with the answer If no answer is filed within the 
stated time, it will be assumed that the claim is 
denied. Failure to file an answer shall not operate 
to delay the arbitration. 
Unless the AAA in its discretion determines other-
wise, the Expedited Procedures of Commercial 
Arbitration shall be applied in any case where the 
total claim of any party does not exceed 515,000, 
exclusive of interest and arbitration costs, The 
Expedited Procedures shall be applied as described 
in Section 54 through 58 of these rules. 
8. Change of Claim 
After filing of the claim, if either party desires to 
make any new or different claim, such claim shall 
be made in writing and filed with the AAA, and a 
copy thereof shall be mailed to the other party, 
who shall have a period of seven days from the 
date of such mailing within which to file an, answer 
with the AAA, After the Arbitrator is appointed, 
however, no new or different claim may be sub-
mitted except 'with the Arbitrator's consent. 
9. Initiation under a Submission 
Parties to any existing dispute may commence an 
arbitration under these Rules by filing at any Re-
gional Office two copies of a written agreement to 
arbitrate under these Rules (Submission), signed 
by the parties. It shall contain a statement of the 
matter in dispute, the amount of money involved, 
if any, and the remedy sought, together with the 
appropriate administrative fee as provided in the 
Fee Schedule. 
10. Pre-Hearing Conference 
At the request of the parties or at the discretion of 
the AAA a pre-hearing conference with the adminis-
trator and the parties or their counsel will be sched-
uled in appropriate cases to arrange for an exchange 
of information and the stipulation of uncontested 
facts so as to expedite the arbitration proceedings. 
11. Fixing of Locale 
The parties may mutually agree on the locale where 
the arbitration is to be held. If the locale is not 
designated within seven days from the date of fil-
ing the Demand or Submission, the AAA shall have 
power to determine the locale. Its decision shall be 
final and binding. If any party requests that the 
hearing be held in a specific locale and the other 
party files no objection thereto within seven days 
after notice of the request, the locale shall be the 
one requested. 
12. Qualifications of Arbitrator 
Any Arbitrator appointed pursuant to Section 13 
or Section 15 shall be neutral, subject to disqualifi-
cation for the reasons specified in Section 19. If 
the agreement of the parties names an Arbitrator 
or specifies any other method of appointing an 
Arbitrator, or if the parties specifically agree in 
writing, such Arbitrator shall not be subject to dis-
qualification for said reasons. 
13. Appointment from Panel 
If the parties have not appointed an Arbitrator and 
have not provided any other method of appoint-
ment, the Arbitrator shall be appointed in the fol-
lowing manner: Immediately after the filing of the 
Demand or Submission, the AAA shall submit 
simultaneously to each party to the dispute an 
identical list of names of persons chosen from the 
Panel. Each party to the dispute shall have seven 
days from the mailing date in which to cross off 
any names objected to, number the remaining 
names to indicate the order of preference, and re-
turn the list to the AAA. If a party does not return 
the list within the time specified, all persons named 
therein shall be deemed acceptable. From among 
the persons who have been approved on both lists, 
and in accordance with the designated order of 
mutual preference, the AAA shall invite the accept-
ance of an Arbitrator to serve. If the parties fail to 
agree upon any of the persons named, or if accept-
able Arbitrators are unable to act, or if for any other 
reason the appointment cannot be made from the 
submitted lists, the AAA shall have the power to 
I make the appointment from among other members 
I of the Panel without the submission of any addi-
I tionallist. 
14. Direct Appointment by Parties 
L If the agreement of the parties names an Arbitrator 
J or specifies a method of appointing an Arbitrator, 
I that designation or method shall be followed. The 
[ notice of appointment, with name and address of 
the appointing party, shall be filed with the AAA 
by the appointing party. Upon the request of any 
such appointing party, the AAA shall submit a list 
of members of the Panel from which the party 
may, if it so desires, make the appointment. 
If the agreement specifies a period of time within 
which an Arbitrator shall be appointed, and any 
party fails to make such appointment within that 
period, the AAA shall make the appointment. 
If no period of time is specified in the agreement, 
the AAA shall notify the parties to make the ap-
pointment and if within seven days thereafter such 
Arbitrator has not been so appointed, the AAA 
shall make the appointment. 
i 15. Appointment of Neutral Arbitrator by 
Party-Appointed Arbitrators 
! If the parties have appointed their Arbitrators or if 
| either or both of them have been appointed as pro-
i vided in Section 14, and have authorized such Ar-
\ bitrators to appoint a neutral Arbitrator within a 
specified time and no appointment is made within 
such time or any agreed extension thereof, the AAA 
i shall appoint a neutral Arbitrator who shall act as 
[ Chairman. 
I If no period of time is specified for appointment 
! of the neutral Arbitrator and the parties do not 
I make the appointment within seven days from the 
i date of the appointment of the last party-appointed 
| Arbitrator, the AAA shall appoint such neutral Ar-
l bitrator, who shall act as Chairman. 
« 
j If the parties have agreed that their Arbitrators 
| shall appoint the neutral Arbitrator from the Panel, 
1 the AAA shall furnish to the party-appointed Arbi-
i trators, in the manner prescribed in Section 13, a 
list selected from the Panel, and the appointment 
of the neutral Arbitrator shall be made as prescribed 
in such Section. 
6 7 
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16. Nationality of Arbitrator in I n tona t ion 
al Arbitration 
If one of the parties is a national or resident of a 
country other than the United States, the sole Ar-
bitrator or the neutral Arbitrator shall, upon the 
request of either party, be appointed from among 
the nationals of a country other than that of any 
of the parties. 
1 7. Number of Arbitrators 
If the arbitration agreement does not specify the 
number of Arbitrators, the dispute shall be heard 
and determined by one Arbitrator, unless the AAA, 
in its discretion, directs that a greater number of 
Arbitrators be appointed. 
18. Notice to Arbitrator of Appointment 
Notice of the appointment of the neutral Arbitra-
tor, whether appointed by the parties or by the 
AAA, shall be mailed to the Arbitrator by the AAA, 
together with a copy of these Rules, and the signed 
acceptance of the Arbitrator shall be filed prior to 
the opening of the first hearing. 
19 Disclosure and Challenge Procedure 
A person appointed as neutral Arbitrator shall dis- . 
close to the AAA any circumstances likely to af-
fect impartiality, including any bias or any finan-
cial or personal interest in the result of the arbitra-
tion or any past or present relationship with the 
parties or their counsel. Upon receipt of such in-
formation from such Arbitrator or other source. 
the AAA shall communicate such information to 
the parties and, if it deems it appropriate to do so. 
to the Arbitrator and others. Thereafter, the AAA 
shall determine whether the Arbitrator should be 
disqualified and shall inform the parties of its deci-
sion, which shall be conclusive 
20. Vacancies 
If any Arbitrator should resign, die, withdraw, re-
fuse, be disqualified or be unable to perform the 
duties of the office, the AAA may, on proof satis 
factory to it, declare the office vacant. Vacancies 
shall be filled in accordance with the applicable 
provisions of these Rules and the matter shall be 
reheard unless the parties shall agree otherwise 
2 1 . Time and Place 
The Arbitrator shall fix the time and place for each 
hearing. The AAA shall mail to each party notice 
thereof at least five days in advance, unless the 
8 
parties by mutual agreement waive sucl i i lotic e : r 
modify the terms thereof. 
22. Representation by Counsel 
Any party may be represented by counsel. A party 
intending to be so represented shall notify the 
other party and the AAA of the name and address 
of counsel at least three days prior to the date set 
for the hearing at which counsel is first to appear. 
When an arbitration is initiated by counsel, or 
where an attorney replies for the other party, such 
notice is deemed to have been given. 
23 . Stenographic Record 
The AAA shall make the necessary arrangements 
for the taking of a stenographic record whenever 
such record is requested by a party. The requesting 
party or parties shall pay the cost of such record as 
provided in Section 50. 
24. Interpreter 
The AAA shall make the necessary arrangements 
for the services of an interpreter upon the request 
of one or more of the parties, who shall assume the 
cost of such service. 
25. Attendance at Hearings 
The Arbitrator shall maintain the privacy of tlse 
hearings unless the law provides to the contrary, 
Any person having-a direct interest in the arbitra-
tion is entitled to attend hearings. The Arbitrator 
shall otherwise have the power to require the ex-
clusion of any witness, other than a party or other 
essential person, during the testimony of any other 
witness. It shall be discretionary with the Arbitra-
tor to determine the propriety ot ' the at te ndance 
of any other person. 
26. Adjournments 
The Arbitrator may take adjournments, upon the 
request of a party or upon the Arbitrator's own in-
itiative and shall take such adjournment when all 
of the parties agree thereto, 
,"7, Oaths 
Before proceeding with the first hearing or with the 
examination of the file, each Arbitrator may take 
an oath of office, and if required by law, shall do 
so The Arbitrator has discretion to require wit-
nesses to testify under oath administered by any 
duly qualified person or, if required by law or de* 
manded by either party, shall do so, 
28. Majority Decision 
Whenever there is more than one Arbitrator, all de-
cisions of the Arbitrators must be by at least a ma-
jority. The award must also be made by at least a 
majority unless the concurrence of all is expressly 
required by the arbitration agreement or by law. 
29. Order of Proceedings 
A hearing shall be opened by the filing of the oath 
of the Arbitrator, where required, and by the re-
cording of the place, time and date of the hearing, 
the presence of the Arbitrator and parties, and 
counsel, if any, and by the receipt by the Arbitra-
tor of the statement of the claim and answer, if any. 
The Arbitrator may, at the beginning of the hearing, 
ask for statements clarifying the issues involved. 
The complaining party shall then present its claim 
and proofs and its witnesses, who shall submit to 
questions or other examination. The defending 
party shall then present its defense and proofs and 
its witnesses, who shall submit to questions or 
other examination. The Arbitrator has discretion 
to vary this procedure but shall afford full and 
equal opportunity to all parties for the presenta-
tion of any material or relevant proofs. 
Exhibits, when offered by either party, may be re-
ceived in evidence by the Arbitrator. 
The names and addresses of all witnesses and exhib-
its in order received shall be made a part of the 
record. 
30. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party 
Unless the law provides to the contrary, the arbitra-
tion may proceed in the absence of any party 
which, after due notice, fails to be present or fails 
to obtain an adjournment. An award shaU not be 
made solely on the default of a party. The Arbitra-
tor shall require the party who is present to submit 
such evidence as the Arbitrator may require for the 
making of an award. 
31 . Evidence 
The parties may offer such evidence as they desire 
and shall produce such additional evidence as the 
Arbitrator may deem necessary to an understand-
ing and determination of the dispute. The Arbitra-
tor, when authorized by law to subpoena witnesses 
or documents, may do so upon the Arbitrator's 
own initiative or upon the request of any party. 
The Arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevancy 
and materiality of the evidence offered and con-
formity to legal rules of evidence shall not be 
necessary. All evidence shall be taken in the pre-
sence of all the Arbitrators and of all the parties, 
except where any of the parties is absent in default 
or has waived the right to be present. 
32. Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of 
Documents 
The Arbitrator shall receive and consider the evi-
dence of witnesses by affidavit, but shall give it 
only such weight as the Arbitrator deems it enti-
tled to after consideration of any objections made 
to its admission. 
All documents not filed with the Arbitrator at the 
hearing, but arranged for at the hearing or subse-
quently by agreement of the parties, shall be filed 
with the AAA for transmission to the Arbitrator. 
All parties shall be afforded opportunity to exam-
ine such documents. 
33. Inspection or Investigation 
Whenever the Arbitrator deems it necessary to make 
an inspection or investigation in connection with 
the arbitration, the Arbitrator shall direct the AAA 
to advise the parties of such intention. The Arbi-
trator shall set the time and AAA shall notify the 
parties thereof. Any party who so desires may be 
present at such inspection or investigation. In the 
event that one or both parties are not present at 
the inspection or investigation, the Arbitrator shall 
make a verbal or written report to the parties and 
afford them an opportunity to comment. 
34. Conservation of Property 
The Arbitrator may issue such orders as may be 
deemed necessary to safeguard the property which 
is the subject matter of the arbitration without prej-
udice to the rights of the parties or to the final de-
termination of the dispute. 
35. Closing of Hearings 
The Arbitrator shall specifically inquire of all par-
ties whether they have any further proofs to offer 
or witnesses to be heard. Upon receiving negative 
replies, the Arbitrator shall declare the hearings 
closed and a minute thereof shall be recorded. If 
briefs are to be filed, the hearings shall be declared 
10 11 
closed as of the final date set by the Arbitrator for 
the receipt of briefs. If documents are to be filed 
as provided for in Section 32 and the date set for 
their receipt is later than that set for the receipt of 
briefs, the later date shall be the date of closing the 
hearings. The time limit within which the Arbitra-
tor is required to make the award shall commence 
to run, in the absence of other agreements by the 
parties, upon the closing of the hearings. 
36. Reopening of Hearings 
The hearings may be reopened on the Arbitrator's 
own motion, or upon application of a party, at any 
time before the award is made. If the reopening of 
the hearings would prevent the making of the award 
within the specific time agreed upon by the parties 
in the contract out of which the controversy has 
arisen, the matter may not be reopened, unless the 
parties agree upon the extension of such time limit. 
When no specific date is fixed in the contract, the 
Arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and the Arbi-
trator shall have thirty days from the closing of 
the reopened hearings within which to make an 
award. 
37. Waiver of Oral Hearings 
The parties may provide, by written agreement, 
for the waiver of oral hearings. If the parties are 
unable to agree as to the procedure, the AAA shall 
specify a fair and equitable procedure. 
38. Waiver of Rules 
Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after 
knowledge that any provision or requirement of 
these Rules has not been complied with and who 
fails to state objection thereto in writing, shall be 
deemed to have waived the right to object:, 
39„ Extensions of Time 
The parties may modify any period of time by 
mutual agreement. The AAA for good cause may 
extend any period of time established by these 
Rules, except the time for making the award. The 
AAA shall notify the parties of any such extension 
of time and its reason therefor.,, 
40 . Communication with Arbitrator and 
Serving of Notice 
(a) There shall be no communication between the 
parties and a neutral Arbitrator other than at oral 
hearings* Any other oral or written communica-
tions from the parties to the Arbitrator shall be di-
rected to the AAA for transmittal to the Arbitrator. 
(b) Each party to an agreement which provides for 
arbitration under these Rules shall be deemed to 
have consented that any papers, notices or process 
necessary or proper for the initiation or continua-
tion of an arbitration under these Rules and for 
any court action in connection therewith or for 
the entry of judgment on any award made there-
under may be served upon such party by mail ad-
dressed to such party or its attorney at its last 
known address or by personal service, within or 
without the state wherein the arbitration is to be 
held (whether such party be within or without the 
United States of America), provided that reason-
able opportunity to be heard with regard thereto 
has been granted such party. 
41 , Time of Award 
The award shall be made promptly by the Arbitra-
tor and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or 
specified by law, no later than thirty days from 
the date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings 
have been waived, from the date of transmitting 
the final statements and proofs to the Arbitrator. 
42. Form of Award 
The award shall be in writing and shall be signed 
either by the sole Arbitrator or by at least a ma-
jority if there be more than one, It shall be exe-
cuted in the manner required by law. 
43 = Scope ol Award 
The Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief 
which the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and 
within the scope of the agreement of the parties-
including, but not limited to, specific performance 
of a contract. The Arbitrator, in the award, shall 
assess arbitration fees and expenses in favor of any 
party and, in the event any administrative fees or 
expenses are due the A A A. in favor of the AA \ 
44. Award upon Settlement 
If the parties settle their dispute during the course 
of the arbitration, the Arbitrator, upon their re-
quest, may set forth the terms of the agreed set-
tlement in an award,. 
45 Delivery of Awai d to Parties 
Parties shall accept as legal delivery of the award 
the placing of the award or a true copy thereof in 
the mail by the AAA, addressed to such party at 
its last known address or to its attorney, or person-
al service of the award, or the filing of the award 
in any manner which may be prescribed by law. 
46. Release of Documents for Judicial 
Proceedings 
The AAA shall, upon the written request of a par-
ty, furnish to such party, at its expense, certified 
facsimiles of any papers in the AAA's possession 
that may be required injudicial proceedings relat-
ing to the arbitration. 
47. Applications to Court and Exclusion of 
Liability 
(a) No judicial proceedings by a party relating to 
the subject matter of the arbitration shall be 
deemed a waiver of the party's right to arbitrate. 
(b) Neither the AAA nor any Arbitrator in a pro-
ceeding under these Rules is a necessary party in 
judicial proceedings relating to the arbitration. 
(c) Parties to these Rules shall be deemed to have 
consented that judgment upon the arbitration 
award may be entered in any Federal or State 
Court having jurisdiction thereof. 
(d) Neither the AAA nor any Arbitrator shall be 
liable to any party for any act or omission in con-
nection with any arbitration conducted under these 
Rules 
48. Administrative Fees 
As a not-for-profit organization, the AAA shall 
prescribe an Administrative Fee Schedule and a 
Refund Schedule to compensate it for the cost of 
providing administrative services. The schedule in 
effect at the time of filing or the time of refund 
shall be applicable. 
The administrative fees shall be advanced by the 
initiating party or parties, subject to final appor-
tionment by the Arbitrator in the award. 
When a matter is withdrawn or settled, the refund 
shall be made in accordance with the Refund 
Schedule. 
The AAA, in the event of extreme hardship on the 
part of any party, may defer or reduce the admin-
istrative fee. 
49. Fee When Oral Hearings are Waived 
When all oral hearings are waived under Section 37. 
the Administrative Fee Schedule shall apply. 
50. Expenses 
The expenses of witnesses for either side shall be 
paid by the party producing such witnesses. 
The cost of the stenographic record, if any is made, 
and all transcripts thereof, shall be prorated equally 
among all parties ordering copies unless they shall 
otherwise agree and shall be paid for by the respon-
sible parties directly to the reporting agency. 
All other expenses of the arbitration, including re-
quired traveling and other expenses of the Arbit ra-
tor and of AAA representatives, and the expenses 
of any witness or the cost of any proofs produced 
at the direct request of the Arbitrator, shall be 
borne equally by the parties, unless they agree 
otherwise, or unless the Arbitrator, in the award, 
assesses such expenses or any part thereof against 
any specified party or parties. 
51. Arbitrator's Fee 
Members of the National Panel of Arbitrators who 
serve as neutral Arbitrators do so in most cases 
without fee. In prolonged or in special cases the 
parties may agree to pay a fee, or the AAA may 
determine that payment of a fee by the parties is 
appropriate and may establish a reasonable amount, 
taking into account the extent of service by the 
Arbitrator and other relevant circumstances ot the 
case. When neutral Arbitrators are to be paid, the 
arrangements for compensation shall be made 
through the AAA and not directly between the 
parties and the Arbitrators. 
52. Deposits 
The AAA may require the parties to deposit in 
advance such sums of money as it deems necessary 
to defray the expense of the arbitration, including 
the Arbitrator's fee. if any. and shall render an ac-
counting to the parties and return any unexpended 
balance. 
53. Interpretation and Application of Rules 
The Arbitrator shall interpret and apply these Rules 
insofar as they relate to the Arbitrator's powers 
and duties. When there is more than one Arbitra-
tor and a difference arises among them concerning 
the meaning or application of any such Rules, it 
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shall be decided by a majority vote. If that is un-
obtainable, either an Arbitrator or a party may re-
fer the question to the AAA for final decision. All 
other Rules shall be interpreted and applied by the 
A A A 
58. Time of Award 
Unless otherwise agreed to by Che parties, the -
Award shall be rendered not later than five (5) 
business days from the date of the closing of the 
hearing. 
EXPEDITED PROCEDURES 
54. Notice by Telephone 
The parties shall accept all notices from the AAA 
by telephone. Such notices by the AAA shall sub-
sequently be confirmed in writing to the parties. 
Notwithstanding the failure to confirm in writing 
any notice or objection hereunder, the proceeding 
shall nonetheless be valid if notice has, in fact, 
been given by telephone, 
55. Appointment and Qualifications of 
Arbitrators 
The AAA shall submit simultaneously to each party 
to the dispute an identical list of five members of 
the Commercial Arbitration Panel of Arbitrators 
from which one arbitrator shall be appointed. Each 
party shall have the right to strike two names from 
the list on a peremptory basis. The list is return-
able to the AAA within 10 days from the date of 
mailing. If for any reasons the appointment cannot 
be made from the list, the AAA shall have the au-
• y to make the appointment from among 
uthei members of the Panel without the submis-
sion of additional lists, Such appointment shall be 
subject to disqualification for the reasons specified 
in Section 19. The parties shall be given notice by 
telephone by the AAA of the appointment of the 
Arbitrator. The parties shall notify the AAA. by 
telephone, within seven (7) days of any objections 
to the Arbitrators appointed. Any objection by a 
party to such Arbitrator shall be confirmed in writ-
ing to the AAA with a copy to the other party(ies). 
56. Time and Place of Hearing 
The Arbitrator shall fix the date, time and place of 
the hearing, The AAA will notify the parties by 
telephone, seven (7) days in advance of the hearing 
date* Formal Notice of Hearing will be sent by the 
AAA to the parties. 
57* The Hearing 
Generally, the hearing shall be completed within 
one day. The Arbitrator, for good cause shown,, 
may schedule an additional hearing to be held with-
in five days. 
ADMINISTRATIVE FEE SCHhDULE 
iitufjvp .*.L ,ii the AAA is based upon 
t of each claim and counterclaim as dis-
*i 'he claim and counterclaim are filed, 
iud navable jt the time of riling, 
Amount of Claim 
$1 to $20,000 
$20,000 to $40,000 
$40,000 to $80,000 
*hi),oiv •• siM\;i.io 
$160 000 io SVt)0U 0<'M 
Fee 
37o (minimum S200) 
$600, plus 27c of excess 
over S 20,000 
$1000, plus Y7r of excess 
over $40,000 
$ 1400, plus Vz% of excess 
over $80,000 
S18 0 0, p I u s V* rr o f e x ce ss 
over $160,000 
Where the claim or counterclaim exceeds $5 mil- ' 
lion, an appropriate fee will be determined by the 
AAA, 
When noamount can be stated at the time of filing. 
the administrative fee is $500, subject to adjust-
ment in accordance with the above schedule as soon 
as an amount can be disclosed. 
In those claims and counterclaims which are not 
for a monetary amount, an appropriate administra-
tive fee will be determined by the A \ \ 
't vhe'e are more than two parties represented in 
'•lUrition, an additional 107c of the initiating 
"-v - '• *'>p for each additional represented 
party, 
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OTHER SERVICE CHARGES 
$50 payable by a party causing an adjournment of 
any scheduled hearing; 
$100 payable by a party causing a second or addi-
tional adjournment of any scheduled hearing; 
$50 payable by each party for each hearing after 
the first hearing which is either clerked by the AAA 
or held in a hearing room provided by the AAA. 
REFUND SCHEDULE 
If the AAA is notified that a case has been settled 
or withdrawn before a list of Arbitrators has been 
sent out, all the fee in excess of S200 will be re-
funded. 
If the AAA is notified that a case has been settled 
or withdrawn before the due date for the return of 
the first list, two-thirds of the fee in excess of S200 
will be refunded. 
If the AAA is notified that a case is settled or with-
drawn during or following a pre-hearing conference 
or at least 48 hours before the date and the time 
set for the first hearing, one-third of the fee in ex-
cess of S200 will be refunded. 
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APPENDIX "C" 
SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS FROM THE RECORD 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr . 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104 
Salt. Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
State Bar #2180 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County. Utah 
10 1985 
Deputy O r * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-5Q6 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc. and Richard Brady's 
Motion for Dismissal or Stay of Proceeding Pending Arbitration 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Homer F. 
||Wilkinson on May 24, 1985. Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. appeared 
on behalf of Plaintiff Docutel Olivetti Corporation and Lynn G. 
Foster appeared on behalf of the defendants Dick Brady Systems, Ind 
ja Utah corporation and Richard Brady. 
The Court having reviewed and considered the memorandums 
|in support and in opposition to the motion, the pleadings and 
(documents on file herein and having heard and considered the argu-
ments of counsel finds that paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of the Agreemen 
between the parties herein specifically provides that with respect 
fco the purchase and sale of goods and services and the collection 
|pf the debts thereon, plaintiff has the right to avail itself of an 
remedy available to it including the remedy of litigation and that 
the specific provisions take precedence over the general arbitratioi 
1 i language of the Agreement and that the subject matter of plaintiff's 
2 I Complaint * -ein JS nof therefore arbitrable. 
mi in mi I 11 j J 1 1 1 j 
J; r X;: HEREBY ORDERED that defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc. 
g j
 ar - • ,^ tion fox Dismissal of Proceedings Fending 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc. 
ani.l H i i ' l i d i i l Biviiilhi sliiill I I i h i I i. • - . : i t h e r e i n b y 
Friday, June 19 1,38 5. 
DATED
 L^1S ^ 7 ^ ay 0f June, 1985. 
'2 BY THE COURT 
»&»k 
20 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 -2-
Gordon R. Mc DoweU-r-Jr-~ • 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 _ _ _ ^ ^ ^ 
S t a t e Bar No. 2180 By—rf:—— oputyCterU 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County. Utah 
JUL 19 1985 
> HioZeyXUK* • 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC. 
et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-506 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court 
pursuant to Defendants' Objection to Proposed Order and Motion tc 
Clarify Decision and pursuant to Defendants' Motion to Approve 
Statement of Proceedings, and further pursuant to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Enter Default and Motion to Strike Defendants' Statemer 
From the Record, Gordon R. McDowell, Jr. appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Lynn G. Foster appeared on behalf of Defendants Di: 
Brady Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation and Richard Brady. Havir 
heard the argument of counsel for the parties; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Default, having been withdrawn, 
no order thereon is hereby made. 
2. Defendant may file an Amendment to their Answer and 
Counterclaim on or before the 2nd day of July, 1985, if Defendant 
so desire. 
3. The Court intentionally makes no findings of fact in 
1? 
o 
Cf Z 5 2 
8t" 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
support-of i t s r u l i n g cm May .'4, I4BS, im 1 makes no f i n d i n g s of 
f a c t in snpi'ior t- i II MM in | |.IIII N mi ii i in n i i i i ie i s nedrci by 
t h e Cour t on t h r 21v>t <iav o l Jun<->, i I8'i none be ing r e q u i r e d , in 
the vjew of t h e Court. ilex Rulei, j . * (L and 52(b) o i t n e Utah 
Rules >\\ r i',/ i I I'roced,, i ,' 
4t—¥be--Court s t r i k e s Liaes—jhQ- th rough 28 o£-page 1 and l i n e s 
] anH ? nf pago 7 -e^ g -fcfre~Q*4er—signed—fey--the-€ou rt- - w -tb«- — 
-*rjr--e+ -K**H-»T HHHTT-
5. Except as otherwise provided herein. Defendants' 
Objection t:o Proposed Ord«-:r and Motion > "if:". - -iC. 
i Defendants' Motion , ; roue Perendanis' Statement of 
*r* 
Proceedings is denied. 
The Court makes :,u 
*4r€dr-Oy-
rjj-ing concerning any defenses, counter' 
15 
1R 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
claims or set-offs which may be raise<1 ~ hfn? litigation by 
defendants Any issues r'-uitc; • • ;> -.^ :.uu; •: exclaims or 
set-ofts itio, oe brought before the Court on motion. 
DATED this
 / 7 day oi: {fe*yL i985. 
BY THE COURT 
7^%£g"^~ 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
-2-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing proposed Order, postage prepaid, to Lynn G. Foster, 
Attorney for Defendants, 602 East 3rd South, Salt Lake City, UT 
84102 this £(* day of June, 1985. 
Gayla R. Casper, Secretary 
-3-
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OLIVETTI CORPORATION DEALER AGREEMENT Olivetti 
A4 THIS AGREEMENT made the . . / 7 . . . day of =';F.*^ , 19 t>, between 
OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 155 White Plains Road, Tarrytown, New York 10591 ("Olivetti") 
and .... PICK BRADY SYSTEMS 
G an individual D a partnership S i f . ..O.T+../. corporation 
(Stat* oTIiicvrforatMfM 
5^ 5-j £A<T \4 vv,H SALT LAKECITY UTAH f.i.f.o^.. 
86/ «/-...H.Y.?/ 
ttobph—i . inclM^nf ar t* code) 
tcicyi 
("Dealer") 
mpc 
1. 
Olivetti appoints Dealer as an authorized dealer for the 
sale, leasing, rental and servicing of the Olivetti ma-
chines set forth on the scheduie(s) attached hereto and 
accessories, parts and supplies therefor (the "Prod-
ucts") in the geographic area set forth in the schedulers) 
attached hereto (the "Territory") commencing on the 
date this Agreement is executed by Olivetti. The dcal-
ershipcreatcd by this Agreement .shall continue in effect 
until terminated by Olivetti or Dealer in accordance 
with ihc terms of this Agreement. Olivetti and Dealer 
agree to act in a fair and equitable manner to each other 
and to end users of the Products. 
Olivetti shall 30 days prior to each anniversary of 
the commencement date assign Dealer a mutually ag-
reeable annual quota for purchase of Products from 
Olivetti during the succeeding year in order for Dealer 
to retain the dealership created by this Agreement. 
Such quota shall be set forth in a new schedule(s) which 
shall be part of this Agreement. Quotas for new Prod-
ucts will be established at the time of introduction of 
such Products. Fulfillment of quota is essential to this 
dealership* Failure of Dealer to achieve 409fc of its annual 
quota during any consecutive six month periinl may be 
treated by Olivetti as an event of default. Other sales 
goals or incentives will be established from time to time 
in connection with contests and sales achievement clubs-
Olivetti reserves the right to negotiate an agree-
ment with national or government accounts for the 
sale, lease, rental or service of the Products in the Ter-
ritory. Olivetti may assign to Dealer that portion of 
any account which provides for sale, lease, rental 
or service of the Products in the Territory. Dealer 
agrees to accept such assignment and to perform such 
contract. 
2. 
Dealer shall do everything possible actively and con-
tinually to promote and encourage the sale, leasing, 
rental and servicing of the Products in the Territory. 
In particular. Dealer shall establish and maintain an 
adequate number of service locations staffed with a 
reasonable number of competent, trained personnel 
and maintain an adequate inventory of spare parts to 
as.sure prompt service. Dealer shall perform any 
Olivetti warranty service applicable to the Products 
used in the Territory. If Dealer sells any Products which 
are used within the warranty period outside of the Ter-
location in accordance with the current delivery and 
installation policy established by Olivetti for installa-
tion, training and warranty service* 
Olivetti will use its best efforts to maintain an 
adequate supply of spare parts for the Products, but 
shall not be responsible for events beyond its control. 
3. 
Dealer will conduct the dealership created by this 
Agreement for its own account. It is understood that 
Dealer has no authority to obligate Olivetti for any 
liability relating to the dealership or the Products. 
4. 
Olivetti will sell, and Dealer will purchase, the Prod-
ucts in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement. Olivetti will give Dealer thirty (30) 
days' prior notice of any increase in prices. 
5. 
OHvetti grants Dealer a license to use its registered 
trademark and trade name "Olivetti" in connection 
with the dealership created by this Agreement, but 
only in accordance with the guidelines and directions 
specifically set forth by Olivetti. Dealer shall not add 
to, obliterate, deface or remove anv brand, trademark 
i>r serial number carried on the machine or packaging 
thereof. Dealer acknowledges that the trademark and 
trade name "Olivetti" are extremely valuable assets of 
Olivetti and that such license grants Dealer access to 
Olivetti's valuable good will. Olivetti may at any time 
object to a specific application of any Olivetti trademark 
or trade name* In such an event. Dealer will cease mak-
ing such application of the trademark or trade name 
immediately. The license created by this paragraph shall 
terminate automatically at the same time as the termina-
tion of the dealership created by this Agreement. Dealer 
shall not acquire, and specifically disclaims, any other 
right in such trademark or trade name or any right in any 
other Olivetti trademark or trade name and shall not use 
any Olivetti trademark or trade name or part thereof as 
part of the business name of its company. 
Dealer may not assign or transfer, voluntarily or by 
operation of law, by means of merger, consolidation, 
sale of assets or transfer of control by transfer of 
shares or otherw ise, all or any part of its interest i n or 
obligations under this Agreement without the prior 
written consent of Olivetti and any such attempted 
assignment or delegation shall be null and void Such 
7. 
Olivetti may, from time to time, ixauc policy manuals, 
circular letters and service manuals and bulletins 
relating to various matters, including, but not lim-
ited to. new products, national accounts, government 
accounts, intcrtcrritorial transfers* servicing stan-
dards, prices, transfer of delivery and installation fees, 
use of trademarks, advertising (such as Yellow Pages) 
and the furnishing of general market information to 
Olivetti. It is understood and agreed that such manuals, 
letters and bulletins shall be part of this Agreement, and 
shall be returned to Olivetti upon termination of the 
dealership. 
8. 
Dealer agrees to use and abide by the terms and 
conditions of Olivetti purchase order forms and in-
voices when purchasing the Products. 
9. 
Dealer agrees that Olivetti retains the entire pro-
prietary rights and title to any software which it 
provides to Dealer. Olivetti merely conveys a non-ex-
clusive, non-transferrable license to Dealer and its 
customers to use such software in connection with the 
Products. That license does not include the right to 
publish or license such software to others or to use it 
for non-Olivetti hardware. 
10. 
Dealer hereby grants Olivetti a security interest in 
all Olivetti brand equipment and inventory which 
Dealer presently owns or may hereafter acquire and any 
additions or accessions thereto and the proceeds 
thereof. Dealer authorizes Olivetti to sign and file 
financing statements in favor of Olivetti. Upon request. 
Dealer agrees to execute such financing statement! N). If 
an event of default by IVraler occurs under any credit 
agreement with Olivetti. Olivetti may. amongothcr rem-
edies, avail itself of any remedy in effect now or at the 
time of default under the Uniform Commercial Code or 
any similar statute. In the event Olivetti successfully 
brings legal action against Dealer for the collection of an 
unpaid account, Dealer agrees to pay all reasonable 
collect ion costs and legal expenses including reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
11. 
Either party may terminate the dealership created by 
this Agreement at any time for violation of ithe terms of 
this Agreement upon thirty (30) days" prior written 
notice sent by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
unless the violation is cured within such thirty-day 
period. 
12. 
All disputes arising under this Agreement or pertaining 
in any manner to the dealership created by this Agree-
ment shall be resolved by arbitration by an Appeal 
Board in accordance with the then-current Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion PA.A.A."). The Appeal Board shall consist of 
three members: one appointed by Olivetti, one which 
may be appointed by the National Office Machine 
Dealers Association, upon request of Deakr, and, if 
required, one appointed by the A.A.A. The arbitration 
hearing shall be conducted at the regional office of 
A.A.A. closest to the principal office of the party 
against whom arbitration is demanded, unless Olivetti 
and Dealer agree upon a different location. The fact that 
Olivetti or Dealer may obtain a provisional remedy from 
a court of law prior to. or during the course of, the 
arbitration hearing shall not be deemed a waiver of 
arbitration or deprive the Appeal Board of jurisdiction 
over the dispute. Judgment upon the award rendered by 
the Appeal Board may be entered in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof. 
If the Appeal Board finds in favor of Olivetti, 
Dealer shall pay the fees and expenses of the Appeal 
Board. 
If the Appeal Board finds in favor of Dealer, 
Olivetti shall pay the fees and expenses of the Appeal 
Board. 
13. 
Olivetti shall not be liable to Dealer for failure to 
make delivery of the Products when due to any cause 
or event beyond Olivetti's reasonable control. In such 
event, Olivetti may cancel the orderis) or extend the 
period for performance to the extent of the delay 
occasioned thereby. Olivetti will notify Dealer of any 
cancellation of an order and use its best efforts to notify 
Dealer of any delay in delivery. 
14. 
This instrument and the accompanying schedule consti-
tute the entire Agreement between the parties and 
supersede all contemporaneous and previous agree-
ments related to the same subject matter. 
15. 
This agreement shall be binding upon, and inure to 
the benefit of, the respective heirs, beneficiaries, per-
sonal representatives, successors and assigns of the 
parties, except as otherwise herein provided. It may 
not be modified or amended except in writing, signed 
by a duly authorized representative of the party to be 
bound. Only the President, or a Vice President shall be 
deemed a duly authorized representative of Olivetti. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have 
caused this Agreement to be executed as of 
the datfHar^Cabove written. 
OUVEJTI CORPORATION 
Date / 4 ^ /? &> 
LYNN G. FOSTER 
JOHN R. MERKLING 
Attorney for Defendant 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone:' ' 364-5633 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, RICHARD BRADY, 
DOES I THRU 10 WHOSE IDENTITIES 
ARE UNKNOWN, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 85-506 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OR STAY 
OF PROCEEDINGS PENDING 
ARBITRATION 
Defendants move the Court for an Order dismissing this 
action or staying all proceedings and trial in the action filed by 
Plaintiff, pending an arbitration proceeding in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement, between the parties, a partial copy of 
which is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit "A" and which 
reads, in pertinent part: 
12. All disputes arising under this Agreement or 
pertaining in any manner to the dealership created 
by this Agreement shall be resolved by arbitrati' 
by an Appeal Board in accordance with the 
then-current Commercial Arbitration Rules of th| 
American Arbitration Association ("A.A.A."). . 
UiFV SENTTO (XHENT 
This Motion is. ,based on N3^Wr*i¥^«^t*t§J^Arbitration Act, 
k9aay..S_C. 1 et seq.) of the Utah Arbitration Act (U.C.A. 78-31-1 et 
seq.)and the pleadings filed by Plaintiff herein. In support of 
this Motion the Affidavit of Richard Brady and a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities are filed herewith. 
DATED this /Z 7* day of February, 1985. 
JOHN R. MERKLING s^J 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion for Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration to 
Gordon R. McDowell, Jr., 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84 117, postage prepaid, on this &//] day of February, 
1985. 
LYNN G. FOSTER 
JOHN R. MERKLING 
Attorneys for Defendants 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-5633 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, RICHARD BRADY, 
DOES 1 THRU 10 WHOSE IDENTITIES 
ARE UNKNOWN, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
OR STAY 
Civil No. C85-506 
Defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc. and Richard Brady submit 
the following Memorandum in support of their Motion For Dismissal 
or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration. 
The matter now pending before the court is a suit on an 
alleged contract which contains an arbitration clause. Specifi-
cally, the pertinent portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" reads as 
follows: 
12. All disputes arising under this AGREEMENT 
or pertaining in any manner to the dealership 
created by this AGREEMENT shall be resolved by 
arbitration by an appeal board in accordance with 
the then current Commercial Arbitration Rules of 
the American Arbitration Association ("A.A.A.") 
Gil C • 'V 
84 Q. 
The State of Utah has adopted a policy favoring arbitration. 
That statutory policy is set forth in U.C.A. 78-31-1 et seq. 
Specifically in 78-31-1 the legislature has declared: 
Two or more parties may agree in writing to 
submit to arbitration, in conformity with the 
provisions of this chapter, any controversy 
existing between them at the time of the agreement 
to submit, or they may agree to submit to 
arbitration any controversy which may arise in the 
future. Such an agreement shall be valid and 
enforceable, and no party shall have the power to 
revoke the submission without the consent of the 
other parties to the submission, except upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
recision or revocation of any contract. 
Under Utah law, such a provision as is contained in the 
Agreement, Exhibit "A", is valid and enforceable. In such a 
situation, it would be right and proper for the Court to dismiss 
this action as premature. That was the result in Lindon City v. 
Engineers Construction Company, 636 P.2d 1070. In that case the 
Supreme Court stated: 
The statements of the [District Court] 
indicated that it adjudged that the suit was 
premature. Whatever term is or was used, it 
connotes the conclusion that in any event the 
parties covenanted to arbitrate first? otherwise, 
the provisions therefor would make no sense. ... 
n> 
The trial court decided the suit was premature, 
as do we. Resort to the arbitration process has not 
been had, as agreed, ... The decision of the trial 
court cannot be interpreted other than to say that 
none of the [issues] can properly be heard by the 
court prior to arbitration. 
Clearly, therefore, it is right and proper for Defendant to 
move the Court for dismissal of this Action, either because the 
Court does not yet require jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
because of the contractual and statutory provisions cited above, or 
because the Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted, since arbitration has not been had which is a condition 
precedent to bringing this action. This Motion is properly 
presented under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
before any other pleading is made and should be ruled upon prior to 
Defendants1 filing of an Answer.f 
Moreover, the Complaint clearly shows that Plaintiff is a 
foreign corporation doing business in the State of Utah and that 
Dick Brady Systems, Inc. is a Utah Corporation and Richard Brady is 
an individual residing in Utah. The Agreement before the Court, 
therefore, involves interstate commerce and is, therefore, subject 
to the provisions of 9 U.S.C. §1, et seq., the Federal Arbitration 
Act*. Much of the Utah Arbitration Act is based on these provisions 
of Federal Law, 9 U.S.C. §2 provides specifically: 
A written provision in ... a contract 
evidencing a contract involving commerce to settle 
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out 
of such contract or transaction or the refusal to 
perforin the whole or any part thereof, of any 
agreement in writing to submit t o arbitration an 
existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal/ shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exists at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
The Federal Arbitration Act provides for an accelerated 
proceeding for compelling arbitration by Petition to the U.S. 
District Court. 9 U.S.C. Section 4 states in pertinent part: 
A party agrieved by the al^ egeft iai\ure, 
neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a 
written agreement for arbitration may petition in 
the United States District Court, which, save for 
such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 
28, in a civil action of the subject matter of a 
suit arising out the controversy between the 
parties, for an order directing such arbitration 
proceed in the manner provided f°r in such 
agreement. ... The Court shall hear the parties, 
and upon being satisfied that the making of the 
agreement for arbitration or failure to comply 
therewith is not an issue, the Court shall make an 
order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. The hearings and proceedings under such 
agreement, shall be within the district in which 
the petition for an order directing such arbitra-
tion is filed. •.. 
Defendants represent to the Court that they are in fact 
promptly and diligently seeking to commence arbitration in 
accordance with the terms of the Agreement and are contemporan-
eously filing a petition to Compel Arbitration in the United States 
District for the Central District of Utah, as they are required to 
do bX-?§^^A^S-tatut.e^ 
9 U.S.C. §3 provides for a stay of proceedings pending 
arbitration and for the issuance of an Order by the United States 
District Court for such stay. It has held that the Federal 
Arbitration Act applies to cases commenced in State Courts, and the 
Federal District Court may stay state Court proceedings brought in 
controvention of a valid arbitration clause, contained in a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. Network 
Cinema Corp. v. Glassburn, 357 F. Supp. 169 (D.C. N.Y., 1973). See 
also De Hart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55 (D.C. Fla., 1976). 
/
/
^ It is apparent, therefore, that under Utah State statutes 
and the case law thereunder, it would be appropriate for this Court 
to dismiss this action until arbitration had been had. However, in 
view of the Federal Statute and the Petition to Compel Arbitration 
which is provided in that statute, it may also be appropriate for 
the Court to stay proceedings in this Court pending arbitration. In 
either case, the practical result is the same. The parties have 
agreed to submit this controversy to arbitration and such 
>roceedings should rightfully be had before further judicial 
proceedings are had. 
Defendants respectfully request, therefore that these 
proceedings be dismissed, or in the alternative, that they be 
stayed pending arbitration. 
DATED this j2~ day of February, 19J 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion To Stay to Gordon R. 
McDowell, Jr., Attorney for Plaintiff, 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 
104, Salt Lake City, Utah 84 117, postage prepaid, on this 
day of February, 1985. 
? 
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LYNN G. FOSTER, #1105 
JOHN R. MERKLING, #2239 
Attorney for Defendants 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-5633 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION, : 
Plaintiff, : OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER 
MOTION TO CLARIFY DECISION 
vs. : 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., : Civil No. C85-506 
et al., 
Defendants. 
Defendants object to the proposed order denying Defendants' 
Motion to Stay pursuant to Rule 2.9 and move the Court to clarify 
the decision rendered on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for a 
Stay on the following grounds: 
1. The Order should state that the Motion to Stay is denied 
solely as to the collection matters raised by Docutel Olivetti, but 
that the above-identified proceedings are stayed as to issues, 
comprising, without limitation, the defenses, Counterclaims and 
set-offs of Defendants which were conceded by Plaintiff to be 
proper subjects of arbitration. 
2. The Order should state that judgment cannot be entered 
in the above-entitled matter prior to the award in arbitration 
relating to the afore-mentioned defenses, counterclaims and 
set-offs conceded to be properly submitted to arbitration. 
^Jrt SEH1 TO O »FN- -1 - x 0 1 ^ \0*"V 
3.. The Order should state any judgment obtained by Docutel 
Olivetti pursuant to Paragraphs 8 through 10 of the Agreement is 
provisional only and subject to the award in arbitration under 
Paragraph 12. 
4. The Order should state that the Utah Arbitration Act, 
78-31a-1, et seq. was applied by the Court and considered by the 
Court as controlling. 
5. The Order should state that, as to Federal issues, the 
Defendants reserved such issues to be decided by the Federal 
District Court and the above-identified Court defers to the Federal 
District Court. 
6. The Order should state that the Agreement was drafted by 
Plaintiff. _ _- „ —i 
--""""*". 7. The Order "should state that the Agreement is ambiguous,/ 
as Plaintiff conceded to the court. 
_^<^r^{f.—-TfrSHJrHer should state that, in the event Dick Brady 
Systems, Inc., is entitled to arbitration, under state law that 
Richard Brady would be entitled to arbitration as well, or, 
alternatively, that no decision has been made by this Court as to 
the status of Richard Brady. 
, * * 
DATED this •?/ day of May, 1985. 
-2-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion to Clarify Decision, postage prepaid, to 
Gordon R. McDowell, Jr., 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84117 on this 31st day of May, 1985. 
fl. Wt40J<r? 
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t%iumy At sail L*«C*~-»toi« oi-ut.n 
6tr-SB6 
Ihers: 
Judge: _ 
Clerk: 
Reporter: 
Bailiff: _ 
. WLK1NSON 
GA. CHILDS 
ALAN flMITn 
GPQVEP MEDLEY 
>RDERS: 
3 Custody Evaluation Ordered 
1 Visitation Rights 
D Custody Awarded To 
D Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
D Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
3 Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:. 
= . Per Month 
Per Month/Year • Alimony Waived 
-j Atty. fees to the. 
j Home To: 
in the amount of • Deferred 
3 Furnishings To: 
3 Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
3 Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
3 Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
3 Restraining Order Entered Against 
. Automobile To: 
3 Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $ 
3 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
3 Divorce Granted To ™> 
• Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry • 3-Month Interlocutory 
D Former Name of 
As 
. Is Restored 
D Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft 
Returnable. .Bail. 
D Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
cqyrt orders the above case be .and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
***« j6w&Kri& 
